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3I. Introduction
This Article proposes a new form of dispute resolution:  Expected Value Arbitration 
(“EVA”).  In some ways, EVA resembles traditional forms of arbitration: disputants choose to 
enter into EVA; they present their legal arguments and evidence to a neutral party; and the 
neutral party imposes a resolution that binds them.  What makes EVA unique is its standard for 
decision-making.  The neutral party is to award her estimate of the expected value of the 
outcome at trial—that is, the average of the possible outcomes with each weighted by its 
likelihood of occurring.1  The expected value of trial is already often used as a point of departure 
for settlement negotiations.2 By relying on expected value, EVA in essence offers the imposition 
by a neutral party of an objectively reasonable settlement.
EVA lies  at the intersection of two trends in the law.  One trend is in the practice of law, 
and it is toward informal dispute resolution.  Recent decades have seen a much-remarked
explosion of alternatives to trial.3 They include mediation,4 non-binding arbitration,5 binding 
1
 See John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase 
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093, 1096 (1991); Note, Settling for Less:  Applying Law and Economics 
to Poor People, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 442, 444 (1993).  
2
 See, e.g., Paul J. Mode, Jr., and Deanne C. Siemer, The Litigation Partner and the Settlement Partner, 12 No. 4 
Litigation 33 (1986).  Various scholars have long relied on models of litigation that recognizes this use of expected 
value.  See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.5, 554-56 (4th ed. 1992); George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Settlement, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, 
Settlement, and Tria:  A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal 
Stud. 55 (1982); Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal 
Stud. 399 (1973).
3
 See, e.g., Richard Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:  A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public 
Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 963 (2000); Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem-Solving vs. the Case Method:  A 
Marvelous Adventure in which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 Cal. W. L. Rev. 351, 354 (1998); Lisa 
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR:  A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration 
Programs, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169, 21_ n. 2 (1993); Roderick W. Macneil, Contract in China:  Law, Practice, and 
Dispute Resolution, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 303, 396 (1986).
4
 For a practical description of mediation see Jay E. Grenig, Alternative Dispute Resolution with Forms, § 2.16, 22-
23, §7.1, 116-19 (2d ed., West 1997)
5
 See, e.g. Myra Warren Isenhart & Michael Spangle, Collaborative Approaches to Resolving Conflict 130-33 (Sage 
Publications, Inc. 2000).
4arbitration,6 and early neutral evaluation,7 to name a few.  
The second trend is more academic in nature.  Scholars over recent decades have 
discussed the potential of partial recoveries.  In particular, they have challenged the prevailing 
assumption that a court must take a winner-take-all approach to dispute resolution.8  They have 
suggested instead that a court could award a portion of the compensation to which a wronged 
plaintiff would be entitled, discounted to reflect the court’s uncertainty about whether the 
plaintiff should prevail.9
EVA improves on the existing proposals for partial recovery in at least two ways.  First, 
scholars have directed their proposals to courts.  Voluntary forms of dispute resolution provide a 
6
 Id.
7
 Jay Grenig, Alternative Dispute Resolution with Forms, §2.59, 30, §18.10-.18.1, 323-24 (2d ed, West 1997); 
Thomas Crowley, Settle it Out of Court:  How to Resolve Business and Personal Disputes Using Mediation, 
Arbitration, and Negotiation 192 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1994).
8
 See, e.g., John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 750 (1964); John E. Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 250 (1980), reprinted from 
Compromise in Ethics, Law, and Politics 190 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979); Rizzo & 
Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts;:  An Economic Theory, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980); King, 
Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future 
Consequences, 90 Yale L.J. 1353 (1981); David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:  
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 487; Robinson, Multiple 
Causation in Tort Law:  Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1982); Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A 
Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-Evidence Standard, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1159 (1983); David 
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. 
L. Rev. 849 (1984); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & 
Econ. 587, 589 (1985); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law § 5.3, at 115-18 (1987); Charles 
Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?  On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 
1382-85 (1985); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. L. Stud. 691 
(1990); Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 231 (2001).
9 Coons began with a modest proposal to split an award “fifty-fifty” when a judge was in equipoise between the 
competing positions of the parties.  John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—the Uses of Doubt 
and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. Rev. 750, 757 (1964).  Rosenberg and Shavell explored awarding a plaintiff recovery in 
proportion to the likelihood that the defendant caused the injury to the plaintiff.  David Rosenberg, The Causal 
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1984); 
Steven Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & Econ. 587, 589 
(1985).  Levmore suggested a hybrid approach that would entail using the standard for recovery recommended by 
Rosnerberg and Shavell in certain cases involving recurring wrongs (depending on the confidence of the fact finder 
in the proper outcome of litigation).  Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 
J. L. Stud. 691 (1990).  Abramowicz extended the sources of potential uncertainty beyond causation to other issues 
of fact (and, to some extent, law) and suggested his own hybrid approach, in which the finder of fact would take a 
winner-take-all approach or award a partial recovery, depending on the likelihood that plaintiff should win.  Michael 
Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 231 (2001).
5better setting for this kind of creativity.  Parties engage in arbitration only if they select it.10
Using a novel standard for resolving disputes that all parties have chosen is far less troubling 
than having a court impose the new standard, regardless of the parties’ preferences.11
A second advantage of EVA over existing scholarly proposals is its use of the expected 
value of trial.  Scholars have not focused on this measure of partial recovery, usually 
recommending instead an award proportionate to the odds that a plaintiff should win,12 which 
has been called “proportionate damages”13 or “proportional liability.”14 Drawing on analytic 
tools from the academic literature on rights theory, law and economics, and game theory, I argue 
that an outcome based on the expected value of trial has virtues absent from other proposals for 
partial recovery.  
The central claims of this Article pertain to trial:  EVA is likely to be both more attractive 
to many disputants and may better approximate justice than trial.  I also show that EVA 
compares favorably in various ways to proportionate damages.15
10
 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
11
 A creative possibility would be to have the court impose a compromise if the parties so request.  This, however, 
would not be easy to achieve.  Parties are somewhat constrained in their ability to choose the standard in court.  
They decide whether to go to trial but, if they do, they at times have to accept imposition of the law as the court 
interprets it.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist 
Reply to Carrington & & Haagen), 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 195, 207-09 (1998) (noting mandatory rules in court, 
including strict products liability, the warranty of habitability, usury laws, and certain restrictions on insurance and 
employment contracts).  Courts may be similarly unwilling to adjust the standard of appellate review to 
accommodate the desires of disputants.  See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 
18024 (9th Cir. filed August 29, 2003) (refusing to allow parties to set standard for review in court).  See also Lee 
Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 171 (2003); 
Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales,  Contracting around the FAA:  The Enforceability of Private Agreements 
to Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 Ohio St. J. Disp. Res. 151 (2002).
12
 Abramowicz relies primarily on this measure, although he does so with a proposed hybrid rule that would at times 
take a winner-take-all approach.  Citation.
13
 Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1382-85 (1985).
14 David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 
97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 859 (1984); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil 
Liability, 28 J.L. & Econ. 587, 591 (1985).
15
 The juxtaposition to proportionate damages serves various purposes, including to clarify how EVA would work, 
to emphasize its novel features, and to highlight some of its distinctive virtues.  Still, it should be noted at the outset 
that the two ideas are not mutually exclusive.  If courts were to award proportionate damages, an arbitrator in EVA 
could take that into account in assessing the expected value of a case.
6Part II first explains how EVA would work and what makes it distinctive. 
Part III then describes three likely virtues of EVA.  First, EVA would allow parties to 
insist on their legal rights without the risks of winner-take-all litigation.  In doing so, EVA, 
unlike other forms of partial recovery, does not vary from the average result at trial.  This 
characteristic increases the likelihood of adoption of EVA by all parties to a dispute and means 
that EVA is true to the conception of justice embodied in current law.
Second, EVA may be better than trial, binding arbitration or the most common proposal 
for partial recovery at minimizing errors in adjudication.  In particular, EVA should produce the 
same average error across a set of cases as trial (often called “expected error costs”16) and should 
avoid the largest errors that occur at trial.  EVA, like trial, also should produce a lower average 
error across a set of cases (or lower expected error costs) than proportionate damages.  In a 
sense, then, when it comes to minimizing errors in dispute resolution, EVA offers the best of 
both worlds.
Third, EVA may be more likely than trial to encourage desirable expenditures on 
litigation and, in particular, may provide incentive for a risk- averse party to make those 
investments in litigation and only those investments that will produce a net gain on average in 
dollars for that party .  For this point, I rely on a line of analysis that has not yet been explored in 
the legal academic literature, one that could have significant implications.  To be specific, I use 
utility functions to assess the interaction between risk aversion, the continuity or discontinuity of 
results from a standard for dispute resolution, and expenditures on litigation.  A similar analysis 
16
 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Civil Procedure:  The Economics of Civil Procedure 131 (2003).  I am assuming that 
the social cost of an error at trial is the difference between the right result and the actual result.  For a similar 
approach see Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 477 (1999).
7would be relevant to other fields of the law, including, for example, the choice between 
contributory and comparative negligence.
Part IV assesses EVA from various theoretical perspectives, including that of an 
economist, a rights theorist, and those who endorse a “public-life conception”17 of trial.18
Part V responds to some likely concerns about EVA, including whether the results it 
produces can be reliable and predictable, whether biases may limit its benefits, and how expected 
value arbitrators are to identify the factors that should and should not inform their awards.
Part VI concludes by recommending that providers of dispute resolution services include 
EVA as an option for clients.
II.  Defining EVA and How It Would Work.
At the heart of the new form of dispute resolution that I call “Expected Value 
Arbitration” or “EVA” is the concept of expected value, which is of great use in making 
decisions that involve risk.  The concept has found its way into various aspects of legal practice 
and should be familiar to litigators and potential arbitrators.19
17
 The phrase comes from David Luban.  David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 Geo. 
L.J. 2619, 2634-60 (1995).
18
 Unfortunately, no ready label is available for this last group, as it includes various perspectives.  One possibility, 
although it is underinclusive, is civil republicanism.  See Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial and 
Settlement:  Allocating Attorney’s Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 65,  124-
26 (1996).
19
 A literature has developed commenting on the use by practitioners of risk analysis based on expected value and 
discussing the topic for the benefit of practitioners.  See, e.g., Jame E. McGuire, Practical tips for using Risk 
Analysis in Mediation, 53 Dis. Res. J. 15, 21 (1998) (noting familiarity of lawyers with risk analysis); David R. 
Johnson, Screening the Future for Virtual ADR, 51 Dis. Res. J. 117 (1996) (discussing use of software to assist 
litigators in undertaking risk analysis based on expected value); Marjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Using 
Decision Trees as Tools for Settlement, 14 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 71 (1996) (suggesting analysis for 
decisions in litigation based on expected value). 
8A.  Expected Value – A Familiar Concept in the Law.
Expected value is the mean of the possible outcomes in a situation with each outcome 
weighted by its likelihood of occurring.20 Expected value finds a natural application in the 
resolution of legal disputes.  The expected value of a trial, for example, is the sum of each 
possible outcome in a case multiplied by its odds of being adopted by a court.21
The concept of expected value may once have been foreign to lawyers.  If so, it no longer 
is.  It currently has many practical uses  in litigation.  It can clarify important decisions, including 
whether to sue at all and, once in litigation, whether to settle and on what terms.22
To see how expected value works, an illustration is worthwhile.  Imagine a car accident 
between Penelope and Dwayne.  Penelope claims that Dwayne ran a red light; Dwayne claims 
that Penelope ran a red light.  In either case, the parties agree that they arrived in their cars 
simultaneously at an intersection and Penelope swerved to avoid a collision.  She struck a 
telephone pole and suffered significant injuries.  Dwayne was unharmed.  The testimony of each 
party is the only evidence available regarding fault.  Assume Penelope stands a fifty percent 
chance of persuading a court to award her one hundred thousand dollars and a fifty percent 
chance of losing.  The sum of each possible result multiplied by its likelihood of occurring yields 
the expected value of trial:  0.5 x $100,000 + .5 x $0 = $50,000.  The expected value of trial is 
$50,000.
This expected value can be helpful in various ways.  Penelope would be wise, for 
20
 See John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can’t Remember the Coase 
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1093, 1096 (1991); Note, Settling for Less:  Applying Law and Economics 
to Poor People, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 442, 444 (1993).
21
 John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1096; Settling for Less107 Harv. L. Rev. at
444.
22
 See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Using Decision Trees as Tools for Settlement, 14 
Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 71 (1996) (discussing use of expected value in settlement negotiations, mediation, 
and the decision whether to sue).
9example, to consider it in deciding whether to sue.23 Once she calculates an expected value of 
$50,000, she should compare that to her cost of litigating.  If she expects to expend more than 
fifty thousand dollars by the end of trial it will be, on average, a losing proposition.  Indeed, even 
if she expects her costs to be only $40,000, she will make a net gain of $60,000 half of the time, 
but she will suffer a net loss of $40,000 half of the time.24 In this case, another factor, her 
appetite for risk, will be essential in determining if trial is worthwhile. If she is averse to risk, 
given the modest net expected value of $10,000, she may prefer not to sue at all.25 Her decision 
will not be easy, and it should account for other factors, including the likelihood that Dwayne 
will settle before trial.26 The key point, however, is that a useful analysis of whether to sue 
begins with an estimate of the expected value of trial.
Expected value can play a similar role in assessing whether to make or accept an offer of 
settlement.  Penelope and Dwayne, for instance, would do well to take it into account in 
negotiating. 27 If Penelope is risk-neutral, she should settle for no less than the expected value of 
23
 Id.
24
 Of course, this analysis will be altered if a lawyer accepts her case on the basis of a contingency fee.  Still, even 
under those circumstances, the lawyer will then have the incentives ascribed in the text to the plaintiff and will have 
significant influence over the plaintiff’s actions.  For a discussion of a contingency lawyer’s decisions in light of risk 
see, e.g., Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney’s Fees in Federal Civil Rights 
Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1943 (1998).  Huang’s analysis is quite insightful, although it suffers significantly 
from a failure to incorporate the limited ability of lawyers to cease litigating a case when they have decided it is no 
longer a good investment.
25
 Scholars generally assume that litigants are averse to risk.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise 
Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 231, 240 & n. 37 (2001).  As Abramowicz points out, even 
litigants who have a taste for risk are unlikely to indulge that taste in protracted litigation and would tend to explore 
other high risk ventures, like hang gliding or poker.  Id. (citing Richard Caswell, Deterrence and Damages:  The 
Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2230 (1999)).  Anyone who has seen litigation up 
close knows that it rarely is the kind of exciting process that one would expect to excite people with an appetite for 
risk.  See also Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 1.1, 12 (4th ed. 1992).
26
 Anticipation of the possibility of settlement provides an economic explanation of so-called “strike suits,” in which 
a plaintiff brings a claim without merit to extract a settlement on favorable terms from a defendant.  For a discussion 
of this possibility David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for their Nuisance 
Value, 5 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985).  For an overview of the problem see Robert G. Bone, Civil Procedure:  The 
Economics of Civil Procedure 45-50 (2003).
27
 In this sense, they will “bargain in the shadow of the law.”  See Robert Cooter, et al.  Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law:  A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950 (1979).
10
trial less her costs of litigating.28  If Dwayne is similarly risk neutral, he should settle for no more 
than the expected value of trial plus his costs of litigating.29 Of course, aversion to risk may 
decrease the minimum amount Penelope will accept or increase the maximum amount Dwayne 
will pay.30 And these calculations offer only a range within which both parties will do better to 
settle than they would on average at trial.  Various other factors will determine where in the 
range the parties resolve their dispute, if they do at all, including their skill at negotiations, their 
willingness (or apparent willingness) to endure the costs and risks of litigation, and their 
psychological needs and desires.31  Still, what matters for present purposes is that the expected 
value of trial is an important point of departure in settlement negotiations.  
None of this is new.  Academics have long known that expected value is fundamental in 
taking a systematic approach to decisions involving risk. 32  Litigation always involves risks of 
one sort or another.  It is therefore unsurprising that many lawyers have come to recognize the 
use of expected value in counseling clients, in making their own decisions whether to accept or 
continue to prosecute cases, and in crafting settlement offers. 33 Because of these uses, lawyers 
should feel comfortable enough with the concept to recommend to clients that they enter into 
EVA.  Further, arbitrators should be available who are experienced both in practicing in a given 
28
 For a standard analysis along these lines see Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.5, 554-56 (4th ed. 
1992).
29
 Id.
30
 Id. at 557.
31
 For a discussion of the role of strategic behavior in the amount for which parties settle see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird 
et al., Game Theory and the Law 79-158 (1994).
32
 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.5, 554-56 (4th ed. 1992); George L. Priest & Benjamin 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Settlement, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1984); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and 
Tria:  A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982); 
Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 
(1973).
33
 See, e.g., Jame E. McGuire, Practical Tips for Using Risk Analysis in Mediation, 53 Dis. Res. J. 15, 21 (1998) 
(noting familiarity of lawyers with risk analysis); David R. Johnson, Screening the Future for Virtual ADR, 51 Dis. 
Res. J. 117 (1996) (discussing use of software to assist litigators in undertaking risk analysis based on expected 
value); Marjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Using Decision Trees as Tools for Settlement, 14 Alternatives 
to High Cost Litig. 71 (1996) (suggesting analysis for decisions in litigation based on expected value). 
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area of the law and in assigning an expected value to a case.
B.  EVA is a Distinct Form of Dispute Resolution.
EVA, then, could be a practical form of dispute resolution that draws on the experience 
lawyers have with expected value in various litigation contexts.  Nevertheless, it is a novel 
proposal.  This is in part because, unlike the most common forms of dispute resolution, Expected 
Value Arbitration imposes a compromise.  To understand this claim, it is important to explore the 
two distinctions on which it relies:  between imposed and voluntary outcomes and between 
determined and compromised outcomes.
1.  Imposed versus Voluntary Outcomes.
A first useful distinction is between forms of dispute resolution in which parties have an 
outcome imposed on them and those in which the parties must accept an outcome voluntarily.  In 
EVA, an arbitrator imposes an outcome on the parties.  They have no choice but to accept it.  In 
this regard, EVA resembles trial or traditional binding arbitration.34  In settlement or mediation, 
in contrast, the parties must accept an outcome voluntarily before it can bind them.
Note that, as used here, the terms "voluntary" and "imposed" describe how the parties 
reach a particular outcome for resolving their dispute, not how they choose the method of dispute 
resolution.  Binding arbitration, for example, is a voluntary process for resolving a legal claim.  
Both parties must agree to arbitrate for the result to bind them.35 Trial, in contrast, is often 
imposed on a party against its will.  Nevertheless, much like a court in trial, at the end of the day, 
34
 For a discussion of binding arbitration see generally Thomas E. Crowley, Settle It Out of Court:  How to Resolve 
Business and Personal Disputes Using Mediation, Arbitration, and Negotiation 171-73 (John Wiley & Sons 1994); 
Myra Warren Isenhart & Michael Spangle, Collaborative Approaches to Resolving Conflict 130-33 (Sage 
Publications, Inc. 2000).
35
 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
12
the arbitrator imposes an outcome on the parties.36 Thus, binding arbitration, like trial, involves 
imposed outcomes.
2.  Compromised versus Determined Outcomes.
A second distinction is between compromised and determined outcomes.  Expected 
Value Arbitration involves a form of compromise.  The decision-maker does not choose one 
party’s version of the facts and the law or even a third independent view.  Rather the decision-
maker compromises among the various plausible interpretations of the facts and the law, creating 
an average by weighting each possible outcome at trial according to its likelihood of occurring.37
In trial and traditional binding arbitration, in contrast, the decision-maker, at least officially,
adopts a particular view of the law, finds the facts, and applies the law to the facts.38  In other 
36
 Imposed outcomes should not be confused with situations where a method of dispute resolution is imposed on the 
parties, although an outcome is not.  The parties, for example, may be required to participate in a mediation process
before trial, although the process may prove unsuccessful and any result would have to be accepted by the parties 
voluntarily.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR:  A Critique of Federal 
Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169 (1993).
Similarly, a voluntary resolution of a dispute may require enforcement by a third party.  One party may 
have to pursue litigation to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement.  The settlement agreement itself, however, 
would constitute a voluntary result.
Additionally, some outcomes may blur the line between voluntary and imposed.  If the parties settle after 
resolution of a potentially dispositive motion – or, as often occurs, after the judge has threatened each side with an 
adverse result on, for example, a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss – the outcome might be described as 
partially voluntary and partially imposed.  Little turns on the existence of this grey area.
37
 My definition of the term “compromise” is somewhat broader than the focus of Abramowicz.  See Abramowicz, 
Compromise Approach, 89 Calif. L. Rev. at 236 & n. 24.  It includes any decision that does not choose among 
competing understandings of the facts or the law, whether the decision relies on a single determination of the odds 
that the plaintiff should win or splits the difference between different views of those odds.  Abramowiz focuses on 
the former while recognizing the latter.  Id.
38 This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s position that arbitration merely changes the process for deciding 
a case, not the substantive standard.  See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985).  On the other hand, as Stephen Ware points out, many arbitrators and the parties who appear before 
them believe arbitrators do not act as if they are bound by the law.  See, e.g., Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory 
Rules, 83 Minn. L. Rev.at 720 nn. 78-81 (citing Soia Mentshikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 846, 
861, 867 (1961); I Gabriel M Wilner, Domke on Commercial Arbitration 25.01, at 391 (rev. ed. 1995); Dean B. 
Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice:  A Survey of AAA Construction Arbitrators, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 137, 
154-55 (1994); John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution 514, 636
(2d ed. 1996); IV Ian R. Macneil, Richard E. Speidel & Thomas J. Stipanowich,, Federal Arbitration Law 40.5.2.4, 
at 40:47 (1994); Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration Employment Discrimination Cases:  An Emprical Study, in 
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 
59 (1975); Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 683, 688 
(1992); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 81, 85 (1992)).
13
words, the decision-maker is supposed to determine all legal and factual issues.  Settlement and 
mediation, much like Expected Value Arbitration, will ordinarily involve a compromise that 
takes into account uncertainty about how a decision-maker would resolve ambiguous issues.39
The following chart suggests the possible combinations of these characteristics in the 
most prevalent forms of dispute resolution:
Imposed Voluntary
Compromised ? Mediation
Settlement
Determined Trial
Traditional Binding Arbitration
?
These common forms of dispute resolution pair two distinct notions.  They assume that 
voluntary outcomes must be compromised and that imposed outcomes must be determined.  But 
this need not necessarily be so.
To be sure, a voluntary and determined outcome is difficult to imagine. A party will 
likely reject a determined result that is worse for it than it is likely to do on average at trial.  If 
one party agrees to a result “determined” by someone else, strategic dynamics are likely to have 
39
 Of course, these definitions of voluntary, imposed, determined and compromised do not follow necessarily.  They 
are merely useful.  Moreover, a chosen approach to an outcome is neither irrevocable nor absolute.  Parties may 
receive some imposed determinations on issues that decrease the scope of disagreement and lead to settlement.
Further, whether determined or compromised, an imposed outcome will often not be the final stage in 
resolving a dispute.  It may well leave the parties with opportunities for negotiating for their mutual benefit.  Indeed, 
the negotiations may result in a second-stage voluntary outcome that reflects the cost of enforcing the imposed 
outcome from the first stage.  For purposes of clarity and simplicity, I do not attempt to capture these complexities 
in the chart.
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caused this coincidence rather than a willingness to accept an objective determination of the right 
result.40
The other uncommon pairing of characteristics—an imposed compromise—is more 
plausible.  Parties could reasonably decide that they do not want a decision-maker to choose one 
among the various possible resolutions of each contested legal and factual issue.  Once they 
make that decision, a winner-take-all trial will not do.  Instead, they could enter binding 
arbitration.  They could then develop their case through the usual discovery and legal research, 
and present their positions through documents, witnesses, and legal argument.  Some ambiguities 
might be cleared up, while others endure.  Nothing need be novel about this process.  The only 
necessary variation from trial or traditional binding arbitration would be that the parties would 
instruct the arbitrator at the outset not to resolve ambiguities of fact or law.  The arbitrator 
instead would award a compromise that incorporates uncertainty. EVA entails this kind of 
imposed compromise.
EVA, then, would provide a distinctive form of dispute resolution because it would 
impose a compromise.41 Some other academic proposals share these qualities, but EVA varies 
40
 Mediation, as opposed to settlement, at least involves a third party capable of making an independent 
evaluation of the likely results of trial.  But if the mediator is willing to make any evaluation at all, Cite to debate
beginning with Riskin, she is likely to predict what different judges or juries might do, not to offer a particular 
perspective on the facts and the law.  A party to mediation has little reason to accept a determination that is the 
mediator’s view of the right result, and that is more favorable to the other party than a prediction of how others on 
average would decide the case.  
The form of dispute resolution that may most closely approximate a voluntary, determined outcome is 
Early Neutral Evaluation (often called “ENE”).  In ENE, an evaluator may request an informal presentation of each 
party’s position and ask questions to solicit additional information.  Rosenberg and Folberg, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 1490-91 (1994).  The evaluator may then make an 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, including a likely range of damages if the plaintiff were to 
prevail.  The parties in turn may use this assessment to facilitate negotiations.  Indeed, the evaluator may even reach 
some determinations regarding ambiguous factual or legal issues.  Still, little incentive exists for the party losing on 
an issue to accept such a determination.  For this reason, any settlement in ENE is likely to use the neutral party’s 
assessment as a point of departure for negotiations, not as the ultimate standard by which to resolve a case.  The 
outcome of ENE is therefore unlikely to be determined by a neutral party.  
On the other hand, perhaps this is just an artifact of our culture.  See, e.g., Rebecca Redwood French, The 
Golden Yoke:  The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet 137-40 (1995) (describing outcomes of formal adjudication 
in Buddhist Tibetan legal system as requiring consent of disputants).
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from those proposals in essential ways as well.
C.  EVA Is Unlike Other Proposals for Partial Recovery.
Over the last forty years or so, the idea of an imposed compromise has received episodic 
attention in academic legal circles.  Professor John Coons initiated this intermittent discussion in 
1964 with his germinal article, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—the Uses of Doubt 
and Reason.42 Coons suggested the possibility of “splitting the difference” in cases where the 
position of the plaintiff and defendant were in perfect equipoise—that is, the decision-maker had 
no principled basis for deciding between two equally compelling positions.43 To “split the 
difference,” he would award a plaintiff half the amount she would receive if she prevailed in 
winner-take-all adjudication.44 Coons returned to the subject on occasion,45 but other scholars 
did not engage him.46  Then, in the 1980s, a burst of interest, largely among economists, led to 
several important articles exploring various properties of imposed compromise.47 The focus of 
discussion was the idea of awarding a plaintiff recovery in proportion to the likelihood that a 
41
 Some variants on imposed compromise exist already.  They include interest arbitration, novel procedures in 
arbitration (including final-offer arbitration), and unspoken compromises (which many people believe sometimes 
occur in jury awards and traditional arbitration).  As discussed below, however, EVA is different from all of these, 
for, unlike the existing forms of imposed compromise, it embodies an objective view of the parties’ legal rights.  See 
infra Part III.A.
42
 58 Nw. U. L. Rev. 750 (1964).
43
 Id. at 759.
44
 Id. at 757.
45
 See John E. Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 250 (1980, reprinted from Compromise in 
Ethics, Law, and Politics 190 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979).
46
 An array of distinguished scholars responded to Coons’ initial proposal as is memorialized in part in the pages of 
the Northwestern Law Review.  See Comments on Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt 
and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. Rev. 795-804 (1964).  The discussion is interesting and provocative but does not seem to 
have inspired the participants to write on the topic.
47 Notable contributions include David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:  Justifiably 
Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 487; Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, 
A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-Evidence Standard, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1159 (1983); David 
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. 
L. Rev. 849 (1984); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & 
Econ. 587, 589 (1985); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law § 5.3, at 115-18 (1987); Charles 
Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?  On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 
1382-85 (1985).
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particular defendant caused the harm that a plaintiff suffered.48 After this fit of activity, the topic 
again faded from the academic landscape.  Then, in 1990, Professor Saul Levmore offered new 
insights on the topic, noting particular problems with a winner- take-all approach in certain cases 
involving recurring wrongs.49  He suggested a hybrid approach that would ask a fact finder to 
choose between a winner-take-all approach, proportionate damages, or a form of restitution, 
depending on the fact finder’s confidence in the right outcome at trial.50 Most recently, 
Professor Michael Abramowicz has made a fine contribution to the literature in A Compromise 
Approach to Compromise Verdicts51 expanding the analysis beyond causation to other forms of 
factual uncertainty52 (and, to a lesser extent, uncertainty about the law53) and recommending his 
own hybrid approach in which a jury would award proportionate damages if its confidence in the 
right result fell below a predetermined threshold or an all- or-nothing outcome if its confidence 
exceeded that threshold.54
EVA deviates from all of the past proposals for imposed compromise in at least two 
important respects:  first, the standard it would impose is based on the expected value of trial, a 
measure that has been largely overlooked in the literature; and, second, EVA contemplates 
imposition of a compromise result in alternative dispute resolution, not in court. 
i. EVA Uses a Different Standard than the Existing Proposals.
Throughout the history of proposals to impose compromise outcomes on parties, scholars 
have focused on the possibility of awarding the plaintiff a recovery in proportion to its likelihood 
48
 Kaye, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. at 493; Rosenberg, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 859; Shavell, J.L. & Econ. at 589.
49
 Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691 (1990).
50
 Id. at 692, 721-25.
51
 89 Cal. L. Rev.  231 (2001).
52
 Id.
53
 Id. at 298-312.  But note that Coons originally discussed the possibility of considering legal uncertainty in 
compromise outcomes.  See Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise, 58 Nw. L. Rev. at 764-73.
54
 Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 Cal. L. Rev. at 237.
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of being right. 55  This approach has been called at times proportional liability56 or proportionate 
damages.57 It is materially different from EVA, which imposes a compromise based on the 
likelihood of the different outcomes at trial, which I will call an “expected value” outcome or 
result.
The distinction between an award based on what I call an expected value outcome and 
proportionate damages is significant both in theory and in practice.  The theoretical difference is 
that EVA recognizes uncertainty in legal decision-making and awards a plaintiff a recovery that 
reflects the different possible conclusions different decision-makers might reach.  One jury might 
find a plaintiff with the burden of proof has a fifty-five percent chance of being right and award a 
full recovery.  Another might find the same plaintiff has a forty-five percent chance of being 
right and award nothing.  A decision-maker who believes these outcomes are equally likely does 
not choose between them in EVA.  Rather she takes both into account and awards half of the 
plaintiff’s full recovery.  The award leaves intact uncertainty about the odds that the plaintiff 
should win.
Proportionate damages, and other common proposals for partial recovery, are less radical
in this regard.  They do not leave the uncertainty in a case intact.  The decision-maker is to 
55
 See Kaye, at 493 (suggesting award in proportion to likelihood of causation); Rosenberg, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 859 
(same); Shavell, 28 J.L. & Econ. at 589 (same); Lemvore, at 692; Abramowicz at 236 (recommending award in 
proportion to likelihood plaintiff is right in light of factual uncertainty in certain cases).  David Kaye writes of an 
“’expected value’ rule,” Kaye, Preponderance of Evidence Standard, 1982 Am B. Found. Res. J. at 493, but his 
meaning in this regard is the likelihood that the plaintiff should recover, not the likelihood that the plaintiff would 
win at trial.  1982 Am. B. Found. Res. at 493.  This is one variation on the proposal for awards in proportion to the 
likelihood that the plaintiff is right.  Finally, while Abramowicz does discuss briefly use of the expected value of 
trial for legal uncertainty, Compromise Verdicts at 301, most of his discussion—and essentially all of his critical 
analysis—is directed at a standard that varies between awarding proportionate damages and the traditional winner-
take-all result imposed by courts.  
Finally, Levmore’s discussion of the possible use of restitution to deal with uncertainty appears to be 
distinctive.  19 J. Legal Stud. at 710-21.  I do not explore it in this Article.
56David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:  A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 
97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 859 (1984); Shavell at  .
57
 Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event?, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1382-85 (1985).
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decide the likelihood that the plaintiff is correct.  The plaintiff has a forty-five percent chance of 
being right, a fifty-five percent chance, or a chance reflected in some other precise figure.  The 
decision-maker must choose.  She may have doubts about her decision.  But in awarding 
damages, she resolves these doubts.  She reaches a compromise result only in the sense that the 
recovery she awards will reflect her view of the likelihood that the plaintiff should win.  Her 
award will not embody the different conclusions that other decision-makers might reach.58
The difference between expected value outcomes and proportionate damages also has 
practical significance.  It can have a large impact on a plaintiff’s recovery.  To see this, consider 
a variation on the hypothetical involving Penelope and Dwayne.  Assume, as we did above, a 
dispute between Dwayne and Penelope over a car accident.  Recall that the crux of the 
controversy was over who ran a red light.  Further assume that a finding in favor of Penelope on 
liability would result in an award of $100,000.  The tricky question is whether Dwayne is liable.
In deciding liability, the burden of persuasion falls on Penelope, who must prove her case 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 59 In other words, the finder of fact should decide in favor of 
Penelope if she is more likely than not correct about what occurred.60 Assume that Penelope and 
58
 The difference is much like the one sometimes used to distinguish risk and uncertainty.  See, e.g., David Gauthier, 
Morals by Agreement 24, 42 (1986).  Risk means the odds are known but the outcome is uncertain.  Flipping a fair 
coin involves risk.  We know that the odds are fifty percent that heads will win.  We do not know on which side the 
coin will land.  Proportionate damages incorporate risk:  they assume that the decision-maker knows the odds that 
the plaintiff should win and adjusts the recovery in light of those odds.  Uncertainty means that the odds are 
unknown.  Flipping a coin which one suspects may be weighted toward one side involves uncertainty.  We do not 
know what the odds are that heads will win.  Expected value outcomes incorporate uncertainty:  they adjust a 
recovery to reflect different possible interpretations of the odds that the plaintiff should win.  This distinction 
provides a useful analogy, but I do not limit my use of the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” to these technical 
definitions.
59
 This is the usual standard in civil cases.  See generally, James, Burdens of Proof, 47 Va. L. Rev. 51, 52-53 (1961).  
Of course other burdens of proof—or, more precisely, of persuasion—apply in special circumstances.
60
 Some scholars have questioned this straightforward approach to the preponderance-of-evidence standard.  See, 
e.g., Ronald Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401, 426-27, 434-35, 436-37 (1986) 
(comparing burden of proof as assessment of certainty jurors have in plaintiff’s story); Neil Cohen, Confidence in 
Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985) 
(distinguishing between the probability that event occurred, and confidence in that probability judgment); Lea 
Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U.CHI.L. REV. 116 (1978) 
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Dwayne both claim they were certain that they saw that the light was green when they entered 
the intersection.  In addition, a disinterested witness, Wanda, who was walking nearby, says that 
she saw the accident and that she is unsure but believes that Dwayne was at fault.  For this 
opinion, she relies on her view of the light in her peripheral vision.
The role of self-interest in Penelope’s and Dwayne’s statements, and the admitted lack of 
confidence of the only objective witness, may translate into uncertainty on the part of the finder 
of fact.  It would be difficult to deny that there is some possibility that the light was green for 
Dwayne.  On the other hand, rare would be a jury that would find for Dwayne in light of 
Wanda’s testimony as the sole witness with no stake in the case.  Although the evidence may
weigh in favor of Penelope only to the extent that there is, say, a seventy percent likelihood that 
Dwayne is at fault, nine out of ten juries might agree that Penelope has met her burden of 
proof.61 The great majority of juries might be unsure that Dwayne ran the red light but be 
confident that it is more likely than not that he did so.  If the case were to go to trial, then, 
Penelope would have a ninety percent chance of winning $100,000.
This hypothetical provides a basis for distinguishing possible approaches to imposing a 
compromise.  Under proportionate damages, Penelope would be entitled to recover an amount 
equal to the odds that she is right multiplied by her recovery if she should win.  Under the 
hypothetical facts she should receive 70% of $100,000, or $70,000.  
Expected value in EVA, in contrast, asks not about the odds that the plaintiff is correct, 
but about the average result of trial.  That is calculated by multiplying the likelihood of each 
result by the amount the plaintiff would recover and adding the products together.  In this case, a 
(questioning connection between probability and burden of proof).  As this Article does not argue for or against 
proportionate damages, I need not address this issue. 
61
 Abramowicz suggests a relationship along these lines between the odds of a plaintiff winning and the odds that a 
plaintiff should win.  Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 Calif. L. Rev. at 231 at 
241-42.
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ninety percent chance of recovering $100,000 and a ten percent chance of recovering nothing is 
worth: .90 x $100,000 + .10 x $0 = $90,000.  The arbitrator in EVA should award $90,000 to 
Penelope.
Thus, proportionate damages and EVA are different in principle and can produce quite 
different outcomes in practice.  Before working through the full implications of the difference 
between the two, it is important to discuss a second novel characteristic of EVA—it involves 
arbitration, not trial.
ii.  EVA Is a Realistic Proposal Because It Is a Form of Arbitration.
EVA, unlike existing academic proposals, would not require a court to impose a 
compromise.  Instead, parties to a dispute would choose to have an arbitrator do so.  This greatly 
enhances its likelihood of adoption.
a.  Problems with Use of Imposed Compromise by a Court.
Several obstacles confront any effort to have a court impose a compromise.  One issue
arises if the compromise result is to be reached by a jury, as Professor Abramowicz 
recommends.62 This proposal risks running afoul of the right to trial by jury.  In federal court, 
for example, the Seventh Amendment guarantees parties the right to have a jury sit as the finder 
of fact in certain cases.63  Historical practice at times has played a central role in interpretation of 
the Seventh Amendment.64 Historically, juries have not been instructed to impose compromises, 
62
 Abramowicz at 250-55.  
63
 U.S. Constituion, 7th Am.
64 A typical use of history arose in this regard in the debate over whether an exception exists to the right to trial by 
jury in complex cases.  See, e.g,. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080-83 (3rd Cir. 1980).  
Similarly, the Supreme Court took a particularly strict originalist approach in rejecting the use of additur as violating 
the Seventh Amendment in Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).  Whether this is the best way to proceed is 
debatable.  What seems clear is that courts do in fact at times take an originalist approach to the Seventh 
Amendment.  This could raise an issue for asking a jury to impose a compromise verdict in court.
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but to reach a particular conclusion.  It is possible that asking a jury to do so would change its 
essential function and violate an objecting party’s constitutional rights.65
Moreover, even if a judge finds no constitutional violation, imposing compromise would 
be difficult to reconcile with existing doctrine.  After all, the practice is longstanding of taking a 
winner-take-all approach to litigation.  In our common law system, the persistence of a practice 
is its own rationale against change.  Thus, whether a party asks a judge or a jury to impose a 
compromise, tradition provides a powerful reason for judicial resistance.
This inertia is likely to be particularly difficult to overcome if judges have the intuition 
that imposing compromise is unjust.  That is precisely the intuition they are likely to have.  This 
is manifest in how infrequent it is that a judge explicitly imposes a compromise in a case and in 
resistance by the rest of the judiciary in the rare instances in which a judge does so. 66
More generally, lawyers and legal scholars seem to bristle at the notion of imposing 
compromise.  To many, it just seems wrong.67  I discuss in Parts III and IV reasons to question 
65
 It is true that courts have varied the burden of persuasion that juries are to use and that in some cases the law has 
even varied whether the jury should adopt a winner-take-all approach to such issues as causation.  See, e.g., Sindell 
v. Abbott Labortories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).  In discussing Sindell, courts did not seem 
concerned about the right to trial by jury but, then again, it does not appear that any party raised the issue .
66 Consider Sindell, likely the most renowned case involving some form of imposed compromise.  It has met with 
limited acceptance.  See, e.g., Andrew B. Nace, Note:  Market Share Liability:  A Current Assessment of a Decade-
Old Doctrine, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 396 (1991) (noting that as of 1991 market share liability has been adopted in 
only five states other than California and use of the doctrine had largely been confined to DES, the product at issue 
in Sindell).   Part of the reason may be simply that it varied from the usual winner-take-all approach of trial.  
A similar famous example is Alcoa.  The judge there relied on the doctrine of impracticability to impose an 
outcome that split the difference between the parties.  Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, 499 F.Supp. 53 
(W.D. Pa. 1980).  Alcoa did not have much of an influence on the judiciary.  Indeed, one scholar reports that judges 
within the same circuit have treated Alcoa as having no more precedential value than “a law review article,” which, 
it is to be inferred, isn’t very much.  Wladis, Impracticability as Risk Allocation:  The Effect of Changed 
Circumstances Upon Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 Georgia L. Rev. 503 (1988).  This was no doubt 
in part because the parties settled while the appeal was pending and moved successfully to have the trial court’s 
opinion vacated.  Id. at 586 n. 333.  Perhaps it was also in part due to its use of a compromise result.
67 This was in part the response of no less a scholar than Lon Fuller in a conference that addressed John Coons’ 
paper, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise.  Fuller stated a concern that compromise results based on factual 
uncertainty might be particularly appealing to a dishonest witness, who could muddy the waters sufficiently to enjoy 
some success under a “split-the-difference” rule without committing to such a strong statement that it would be 
possible to prove that the perjurer lied.  58 Nw. L. Rev. 731, 798-99.  This view does not seem to have much logical 
force.  There is little reason to think that the marginal gain on average to a perjurer from being vague and deceptive
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this resistance to compromise.  But that the judiciary would be reluctant adopt compromise as a 
standard for dispute resolution is difficult to deny.68  Indeed, this may explain the paucity of 
doctrines that award partial recovery, notwithstanding the strong arguments in their favor, at 
least in some circumstances.69
b.  Advantages to Imposing Compromise in Arbitration.
In every regard arbitration provides a more hospitable environment than trial for 
experimenting with imposed compromise.
1.  The Enforceability of EVA in Court.
One of the clearest contrasts between use of imposed compromise at trial and in 
arbitration is the enforceability of the outcome.  Whereas the very real prospect of a de novo
appeal confronts a judge who has imposed a compromise,70 the standard for review of an arbitral 
award is extraordinarily deferential.71 In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”72 This deference has meant that the 
should be greater in litigation leading to a compromised as opposed to a winner-take-all result.  Such deception 
might make a marginal difference on the recovery of the plaintiff if the outcome is an imposed compromise.  The 
odds of it having a similar effect on winner-take-all litigation may be smaller, but when it does nudge the plaintiff 
past the threshold of the burden of persuasion, its effect on a case will be far more dramatic.  It is not clear that 
either system would give a systematically greater advantage to those willing to resort to strategic mendacity.  
Fuller’s reaction is perhaps better understood instead as reflecting intuitive doubts about compromise results, which 
seem to be quite common.
68
 In addition to these difficulties, there is the problem that courts may not be well-suited to conducting experiments.  
This may be true in part because it is difficult for a judge to test application of a new approach in a single case or 
group of cases.  Courts usually seek to declare a rule that will apply generally.  As a result, for a court to impose 
compromise in a particular instance suggests its application in other cases as well.  This is a step that even judges 
otherwise inclined to innovate may be unwilling to take.
69
 The fact is that despite the strong arguments in favor of imposed compromise by such respected scholars as 
Coons, Rosenberg, Shavell, Levmore, Abramowicz, and others, the standard has not been widely adopted by courts.
70
 The proper standard for decision-making in a trial court is a legal question.  See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 
279 (1991).  It is an issue on which the trial court judge is entitled to no deference on appeal.  See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 526 (1961) (questions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal).
71
 See generally Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:  Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration 
Awards, 30 Ga. L. rev. 731 (1996) (recognizing the great deference courts show to arbitration awards); Stephen J. 
Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 703 (1999) 
(arguing that courts allow parties and arbitrators to create new legal standards through arbitration).
72
 Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983)).  See also Gilmer v. Intestate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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great majority of arbitration decisions survive judicial review.73  As a result, if the parties choose 
to enter into EVA, whoever prevails is very likely to have the full force of the judiciary behind 
the result. 
The limited grounds for upsetting arbitration decisions would seem not to be an obstacle
to EVA, except in rare cases where an arbitrator fails egregiously to perform her duties properly. 
To see this, consider the analysis if the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies.74 Courts have 
recognized two sources in vacating arbitration decisions under the FAA.  First, the FAA itself 
offers four grounds, all of which one might call procedural:  (1) when the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) when the arbitrator’s conduct exhibited evidence partiality 
or corruption of the arbitrator; (3) when the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct or misbehavior
prejudicing the rights of a party; and (4) when an arbitrator exceeded her powers or so 
imperfectly executed them as to fail to make a final determination.75  None of these grounds 
should prevent enforcement of EVA in general.  As long as an arbitrator is impartial and follows 
the instructions of the parties, the award should stand.76
In some jurisdictions, courts have developed additional grounds for vacating arbitration 
awards.77  In theory, these grounds could pose a problem for EVA, as they provide a basis for 
challenging an award based on, if you will, the substantive standard used by the arbitrator.  The 
most likely potential basis for a challenge may be by claiming that EVA entails a “manifest 
73
 See generally Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 
Minn. L. Rev. 703 (1999); Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:  Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial 
Arbitration Awards, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 731 (1996).
74
 United States Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.A. 1, et 
seq. (2003)).
75
 9 U.S.C. §10(a).
76
 Moreover, as noted above, in assessing the statutory grounds for vacatur, courts tend to be quite deferential to 
arbitrators.  See, e.g., United Paperworks Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).  
77
 Some jurisdictions have refused to recognize any non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards.  See, 
McIlroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993).
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disregard for the law.”78  Some courts have recognized this doctrine.79 It typically requires 
showing both that the arbitrator has made an error that is so obvious it would be readily and 
instantly perceived by a typical arbitrator and that the arbitrator was subjectively aware of the 
proper legal standard and disregarded it in fashioning an award.80
One might argue that EVA entails a manifest disregard for the law.  It asks an arbitrator 
not to try to determine the single right legal result or the single best view of the evidence.  The 
very candor of EVA about the form of compromise it entails may make it vulnerable in a way 
that arbitration awards based on implicit compromises are not.81
Still, it is hard to imagine that awards from EVA would not be enforced in practice, even 
in jurisdictions recognizing “manifest disregard for the law” as a grounds for vacatur.  First, the 
deference that courts show to arbitrators has meant, according to Professor Stephen Hayford, that 
as of 1996 no commercial arbitration award had been vacated based on a “manifest disregard” 
for the law.82 Other scholars have noted that through 2000 or later fewer than a half-dozen cases 
78
 This ground traces its lineage back to cryptic dictum in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).  The doctrine of 
“manifest disregard” has outlived the Wilko opinion itself.  See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko).  
79
 See, e.g., Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Merrill Lynch, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986); San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay 
Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961).
80
 See, e.g., Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 1990).  One court 
reports that every Circuit other than the Fifth has adopted this standard.  Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. 
128 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997).
81
 Cf. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 Minn. L. 
Rev. 703, 724 & nn. 94-97 (1999) (arguing that arbitral awards will be vacated only if they involve egregious errors 
by an arbitrator who consciously disregards the law).
82
 Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray:  Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 Ga. 
L. Rev. 731, 776 & nn. 197-98 (1996) (citing Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards 
in Federal Court:  Contemplating the Use and Utility of the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law Standard, 27 Ind. L. 
Rev. 241,  252 (1993); Thomas Oehmke, commercial Arbitration § 4.28, 103 (1987)).  The very scarcity of 
decisions vacating arbitration awards both supports the conclusion that EVA would be enforceable, and has the 
ironic effect of leaving somewhat of a void about what precisely does qualify as a “manifest disregard” of the law.
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have set aside arbitration awards based on a “manifest disregard” for the law in employment 
cases.83 EVA would be unlikely to upset this trend.
Second, at least one court has concluded that parties may choose a standard for decision-
making in arbitration that a court might refuse to apply.  Prescott v. Northlake Christian School84
recently held that parties were bound by an award based on Biblical principles because they 
asked the arbitrator to look to the Bible for guidance in rendering a decision.85 Given the 
Constitutional commitment to the separation of church and state, if a court is willing to enforce 
an arbitration award based on the Bible, it should be willing to enforce an arbitration award that 
is based on the various possible interpretations of the law and the evidence. 86
Third, EVA does not show a “manifest disregard” for the law, but merely renders a result 
consistent with its competing plausible interpretations.  Its key departure from winner-take-all 
litigation is in how to respond to uncertainty about what the law means, not to change the legal 
standard.87
Fourth, if courts refused to enforce EVA, common forms of binding arbitration would be 
in jeopardy.  In final-offer arbitration, for example, the arbitrator must choose between the final 
83
 Calvin Sharpe, Integrity Review of Statutory Arbitration Awards, 54 Hastings L.J. 311, 333 & n. 109 (2003) 
(citing Michael LeRoy and Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts:  The Autonomy of 
Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 Ohio St.J. on Disp. Resol. 19, 73-84 (2001).
84
 244 F.Supp.2d 659 (E.D. La. 2002).  The court did this under the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA), 
holding that the MUAA was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, which also applied.  Id. at 663-64.
85
 Id. at 667.
86
 It is possible that courts would reach a different conclusion in cases involving statutory or public law.  Some 
recent cases have suggested heightened review, for example, of whether an arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law 
in employment discrimination cases.  See Cole v. Burns International Security Services, 105 F3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (suggesting heightened standard of review of arbitral decisions in public law cases); Halligan v. Piper 
Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating award for employer in discrimination case based on 
manifest disregard for law).  Ware suggests these cases may mark an incremental change in the standard of review 
of arbitration decisions in some areas of the law.  Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules, 83 Minn. L. Rev. at 
742-44 & nn. 163-69.
87
 It is worth nothing that the same may not be true of awarding proportionate damages.  Doing so in a sense changes 
the substantive standard that applies to dispute resolution and not just the approach the arbitrator is to take in 
interpreting competing views of that standard.  See supra note _ and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, for the 
reasons set forth in the text, even an arbitration award based on proportionate damages should be enforceable in 
court.
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offers made by each party.  These offers are likely to reflect the value of a case based on 
competing interpretations of the law.  The arbitrator’s choice between offers, then, is unlikely to 
be consistent with any one view of the law.  If EVA requires vacatur, so should final offer 
arbitration under these circumstances.  The same is true for interest arbitration—it provides a 
binding resolution of a dispute based on the parties’ interests, not based on their legal rights.  A 
general refusal to enforce awards in EVA would seem to require upsetting a significant portion 
of the prevailing practice in alternative dispute resolution.88
Another possible obstacle to enforcement of EVA is that it is “against public policy.”89
This doctrine, however, has not been used to reject creative forms of arbitration, but rather to 
reverse rare decisions that are in sharp conflict with the purposes of the law.  For example, Delta 
Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association International90 refused to enforce an arbitrator’s 
decision that there was no “just cause” for terminating a pilot who flew while intoxicated.  The 
court noted that it would generally uphold an arbitrator’s decision even if it appeared to be 
“wrong,” “unsupported,” “poorly reasoned,” or “foolish.”91 The court would vacate the award 
only if there was an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy established in the law 
against allowing an arbitrator to rule that a pilot is authorized to operate an aircraft while 
88
 To some extent, enforceability in court could vary by context.  Interest arbitration—which at times takes the form 
of final-offer arbitration—often has express statutory authorization for labor disputes.  See generally See Elissa M. 
Meth, Final Offer Arbitration:  A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and International Disputes, 10 Am. 
Rev. Int’l Arb. 383, 385 (1999).  Still, final offer arbitration has uses far beyond that context.  Id. at 384-86.
89
 This grounds has been recognized by at least the Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and the District of 
Columbia Crcuits.  See Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980); PaineWebber, Inc. 
v. Argon, 49 F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 1995);  Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988 (9th Cir 
1995); Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 
994 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1993); Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp., 628 F.2d 81  
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
90
 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1989).
91
 Id. at 670.
27
drunk.92 It found that there was.93 EVA would not seem to violate any similarly explicit, well-
defined, and dominant public policy.
Similarly, some courts refuse to enforce arbitrators’ awards if they are “arbitrary and 
capricious.”94  EVA, however, uses a clear logic to determine a recovery. As long as an arbitrator 
does not obviously fail to follow this logic, the award would not be “arbitrary and capricious” 
and should be enforceable.  So, too, with the refusal of some courts to enforce arbitrators’ awards 
that are “completely irrational.”95  EVA is rational.96
In sum, courts have shown great deference to arbitration.  It is therefore unlikely that they 
would generally refuse to enforce awards in EVA.  This conclusion also finds support in the 
acceptance that parties generally may (and should be encouraged to) settle a legal dispute for any 
amount they choose.97  It would seem to follow that they may ask a neutral party to impose a 
result consistent with the expected value of trial, a plausible candidate for a just settlement.
2.  The Willingness of Providers of ADR Services to be Creative.
Another reason that imposed compromise will work best out of court is that providers of 
arbitration services, unlike courts, have strong incentive to experiment with proposals like EVA.  
92
 Id. at 671, 674.
93
 Id. at 674.
94
 See, e.g., Lifecare, Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 435 (11th Cir. 1995).
95
 See, e.g., Swift Industries v. Botany Industries, 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972); French v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1986).  It is questionable whether this is in fact a 
distinct basis for vacating an arbitration award.  It has been invoked so infrequently that it may be best understood as 
an alternative phrasing of other grounds.  See Hayford, Law in Disarray, 30 Ga. L. Rev. at 788-93.
96
 Finally, courts have sometimes refused to enforce awards based on interpretation of a contract at odds with the 
“essence” of an agreement between the parties.  See, e.g., Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline 
Co., 918 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206 (1991).  This is to ensure that an arbitrator honors the 
terms of the contract giving rise to a dispute.  Id. at 1218.  Courts have stated that this standard should be invoked to 
vacate an arbitration award only if it is in direct conflict with the clear agreement of the parties.  See, e.g., 
Employers Insurance v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 933 F.2d 1481, 1486 (9th Cir. 1991); John T. Brady & 
Co. v. Form-Eze Systems, Inc., 623 F.2d 261, 264 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1980).  No problem would 
seem to arise from an arbitrator basing an award on various plausible interpretations of a contract, as would be 
required by EVA.
97
 See,e.g., Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 Hastings L.J. 1 
(1992).
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It is the sort of product that can help them to secure business that might otherwise go to 
competitors.98  There is even an advantage in EVA to being the first to bring the product to 
market.  After all, experience in EVA is likely to make a particular arbitrator attractive to 
potential participants.  Whoever offers EVA first will have a head start in accumulating 
experience.
Indeed, the most likely route to judicial acceptance of imposed compromise may be an 
established record of its success in arbitration.  If and when arbitrators gain familiarity with 
EVA, and acquire the experience to assess its utility, perhaps courts will adopt expected value or 
some other standard for imposed compromise, at least in limited circumstances.99  Arbitration 
can allow for the kind of practical testing that judges may require before they are willing to 
consider imposing a compromise in their courtrooms.
For these reasons, EVA is a more practical proposal than past academic suggestions 
regarding imposed compromise by courts.  It is therefore worth exploring the potential 
advantages it offers over existing and proposed forms of dispute resolution.
III.  The Benefits of EVA.
EVA holds potential advantages over trial and traditional binding arbitration, as well as 
over other forms of imposed compromise.  In particular, these benefits include:  allowing parties 
to insist on their legal rights without the risks of winner-take-all litigation, minimizing the size of 
98 Indeed, courts may have an interest in deflecting, not attracting, business.  This is consistent with the judicial 
embrace of arbitration in the 1980s which arguably was based at least in part on a desire to ease the case load of the 
federal judiciary.  See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:  A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 978 (2000).  
99
 Note, however, that courts may not be able to impose an expected value outcome, at least not on a regular basis.  
To do so would result in a form of circularity—a court imposing its prediction of what courts would do, based on 
their predictions of what courts would do, ad infinitum.  This is reminiscent of the problem of circularity that afflicts 
certain forms of legal positivism.  See Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously:  Revising Injunction 
Doctrine, 34 Rutgers L.J. 363, 406 & n. 137 (2003) (citing David Luban, Lawyers and Justice:  An Ethical Study 22 
(1988)).
29
errors in adjudication, and encouraging desirable expenditures on litigation.  Part III explains 
why EVA is likely to have these effects.
A. Vindicating Legal Rights Without the Risks of Trial.  
EVA allows parties to avoid the risks of trial while still obtaining a result consistent with 
an objective assessment of their legal rights.100 The outcome of EVA should be the same as they 
would fare on average if they tried their case repeatedly in court.  As a result, EVA should be 
attractive to parties and honor the values embodied in the law.
i. Risk-Averse Parties Should Choose EVA over Trial.
Litigants should prefer Expected Value Arbitration to trial if they are averse to risk.  
Parties are averse to risk if they have concerns that extend beyond the average financial pay-off 
of a venture.  They also care how speculative a pay-off is and have a preference for certainty.101
All else being equal, many people prefer to avoid risk in litigation. 102  EVA allows parties to do 
100
 By “objective” I mean an unbiased party’s assessment of the strength of each litigant’s legal position based on 
the law and the evidence.
101
 Economists tend to assume that litigants are averse to risk, see, e.g., Posner, Economic Analysis of Law §1.2, at 
12; Abramowicz, 247 & n. 57 (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 63, 69 n. 21 (1990)), as do more generally proponents of expected utility theory.  See generally Chris 
Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry:  The Regret Aversion Theory, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 50 & n. 37. 
102
 Relaxing the assumption of risk aversion would give rise to quite a complex analysis.  This is because empirical 
work has shown that attitudes toward risk vary by context.  Empirical work has shown some general trends.  People 
tend to be averse to risk in a couple of situations.  They will not risk a small but certain sum for a moderate to good 
chance at a somewhat larger sum, even if the risk has a higher average pay-off.  They also prefer to pay a small but 
certain sum to avoid the unlikely chance at a catastrophic loss, even if the risk on average would cost less.  In 
addition, people tend to be risk prone (also termed risk seeking) in a couple of scenarios.  They will risk a small but 
certain amount for a very small chance at a large recovery, even if the risk averages a worse result.  This explains 
lotteries.  Similarly, they prefer to risk a large and fairly likely loss rather than incur a certain but somewhat smaller 
loss, even if the average result of the risk is worse than the certain loss.  See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. Risk & Uncertainty 297 
(1992); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 
Econometrica 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Value, and Frames, 39 Am. Psychol. 341 
(1984).  See also Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. at nn. 63-64.
These findings are not easy to apply to litigation.  Whether a result counts as a gain or a loss is not self-
evident.  It depends on framing.  A plaintiff, for example, may consider any recovery in litigation to be a gain.  
Alternatively, she may believe she is entitled to a recovery of a certain amount.  Any recovery less than that amount 
she may consider a loss, rather than a gain.  The choice between these perspectives may have a profound effect on 
her assessment of risk.
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so, while still providing a result that, on average, matches what they would get at trial.  This 
option should be attractive to many disputants.
To see the benefits of EVA for the risk averse, take a simple example.  How would 
randomly selected people respond if they were asked whether they would prefer to be guaranteed 
$6,000,000 or to have a fifty percent chance at $20,000,000?  The expected value of a fifty 
percent chance at $20,000,000 is calculated by multiplying the odds of winning by the amount if 
the person wins: .50 x $20,000,000 = $10,000,000.  Yet $6,000,000 would so fundamentally 
change the life of most people that the extra $4,000,000 in average expected income is of 
relatively little consequence, and not nearly worth the risk of receiving nothing at all.  T o put the 
same point more generally, as a person becomes wealthier, each additional dollar tends to have a 
smaller marginal effect on her quality of life.  For this reason, and perhaps others, people often 
prefer certain gains of smaller amounts to speculative gains of greater amounts.103
The same logic can apply to potential losses.  In many situations, people prefer to pay a 
small but certain amount to the risk of losing a far greater amount.104  Indeed, the insurance 
industry capitalizes on this preference.  Insurance companies must charge more than the average 
These complexities for the most part are not relevant to this Article because parties’ who choose EVA 
generally will be averse to risk.  That characteristic is more pertinent than the reasons for their risk aversion.
103
 Posner’s view is consistent with this analysis.  He relies on diminishing marginal utility as an explanation for risk 
aversion.  Posner, Economic Analysis at 12.  I do not mean to say this is the only possible explanation for risk 
aversion and recognize the potential role of psychological considerations in risk aversion.  See generally Chris 
Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry:  The Regret Aversion Theory, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 50 & n. 37 and57 & nn. 63-
64 (discussing diminishing marginal utility and prospect theories of risk aversion).   Guthrie has offered a new, 
intriguing take on risk aversion—regret aversion.  He suggests that aversion to risk may be motivated in part by 
aversion to regret and may cause people to choose paths that will help them to avoid discovering if they have 
selected poorly.  Id. at 45-46.
104
 Subscribers to expected utility theory and prospect theory agree that plaintiffs should generally be averse to risk  
See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry:  The Regret Aversion Theory, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 50 & n. 37 and57 
& nn. 63-64.  According to expected utility theory, the reason is that each additional dollar a plaintiff wins is worth 
decreasing marginal utility.  Id. at 50 & n. 37.  According to prospect theory, the reason is that most people prefer a 
small, certain gain to the possibility of a large gain, speculative gain, even if on average they would do better with 
the large gain.  Id. at 55 & n. 54.  Prospect theory tends to believe that defendants will frame the outcomes at trial in 
terms of potential losses and, therefore, will tend to be risk-seeking because many people prefer to risk a large, 
speculative loss rather than to accept a small, certain loss.  Id. 
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expected loss of the risks they cover.  Otherwise, they could not pay their administrative costs, 
much less make a profit.  Yet many people buy insurance because they would rather incur small, 
regular expenses than risk owing a great deal.  
Moreover, litigants are particularly likely to be averse to risk.  People are unlikely to 
satisfy whatever appetite they have for risky ventures by taking chance in litigation.  As scholars 
have suggested, other risky options should be more attractive than trial, likely hang gliding, or 
mountain climbing, or poker.105
In any case, some disputants will be averse to the risks of trial , and they should be the 
ones who find EVA attractive.  The winner-take-all approach of trial leads to a greater range of 
possible results and means that more rides on chance than in EVA.  This role of chance is what 
risk averse litigants seek to avoid.   EVA, on the other hand, averages out the possible results.  It 
should lead to greater predictability and less variation in outcome.  At the same time, by 
definition, EVA and trial aim to produce the same average result.  As a result, EVA should be 
attractive to risk-averse litigants.
ii. Parties Should at Times Choose EVA over Settlement.
Settlement offers many of the benefits of EVA.  Once the parties reach a settlement, they 
eliminate the risks and costs of litigation.106 Still, for various reasons even those parties who 
wish to settle are sometimes unable to do so.  Divergent predictions about the outcome of trial, 
strategic behavior, and the psychological dynamic between disputants may frustrate settlement 
efforts.107 Negotiations are particularly likely to fail if each party believes that the other is 
105
 Scholars have noted that even those litigants who have a taste for risk are likely to be able to satisfy it in other 
contexts.  See Abramowicz at 240, n. 37 (citing Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages:  The Multiplier 
Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2230 (1999)).
106
 Of course, the negotiation process is not cost-free.  If it fails, it may simply add to the overall cost of litigation.  
107
 For a discussion of these considerations see Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement:  
Allocating Attorney’s Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 65, 128-32 (1996).
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unwilling to agree to a fair settlement.108 Parties who cannot settle for any of these reasons
should find EVA attractive.
a.  Divergent Predictions.
A common reason parties cannot settle is that they disagree about the likely outcome of 
trial.109 The parties’ predictions about trial may differ by more than the anticipated benefits of 
settlement.  If so, to settle, one or both parties would have to accept a result that is less attractive 
than taking a chance at trial.  
The dispute between Penelope and Dwayne can illustrate this point.  Assume that 
Penelope and Dwayne are the only witnesses to the accident between them and that the parties 
are certain Penelope will recover $100,000 if she wins.  Penelope may believe her chances of 
winning are 80%, for she perceives herself as a far more credible witness than Dwayne.  Dwayne 
may have precisely the opposite view.  He may believe he has an 80% chance of winning.  
Assume that each party expects its costs of litigation to amount to $25,000.  
If each party is indifferent to risk, these divergent predictions preclude the possibility of 
settlement.  Penelope believes she has an 80% of recovering $100,000 and a 20% of recovering 
nothing, and in either case she will lose her costs of $25,000.  The expected value to her of 
litigating through trial is .8 x. $100,000 + .2 x $0 - $25,000 = $55,000.  She will settle for no less 
than $55,000.  
108
 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:  An Experimental 
Approach, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 107, 109-10, 142-50 (1994) (moral indignation about issues internal to settlement 
negotiations can prevent settlement).
109
 This is perhaps the most common explanation among economists for why cases do not settle.  See, e.g., Douglas 
G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 245-47 (1994); Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Law at 555.
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An equivalent analysis for Dwayne is that he has a 20% chance of paying $100,000 and 
an 80% chance of paying nothing, and his costs are $25,000.  The expected value to him of trial 
is .20 x -$100,000 + .80 x. $0 - $25,000 = -$45,000.  He will pay no more than $45,000 to settle.  
Given that Penelope will settle for no less than $55,000 and Dwayne for no more than 
$45,000, settlement is not an option.  Of course, if either party is averse to risk, the numbers may 
move closer together.  Still, divergent predictions may prevent settlement.
b.  Strategic Behavior.
Even if some overlap would allow the parties to settle, if the range of mutually acceptable 
resolutions is small, settlement is unlikely.110  This is in part because of a second potential 
impediment to settlement—strategic behavior.  Under our hypothetical circumstances, Penelope 
might just barely prefer settlement for $50,000 over trial if she is averse to risk.  However, if she 
is confident in her assessment of the odds at trial, she may believe that Dwayne will not force her 
to accept that result.  After all, from her perspective, if Dwayne pays only $50,000, he is 
capturing the lion’s share of the benefit to both parties from settlement.  She may refuse to settle 
unless she is paid a larger amount than the smallest sum she would in fact prefer to trial.  If 
Dwayne says he would prefer trial to paying what she demands, she may not believe him.  A 
similar set of strategic concerns may motivate Dwayne.  In this way, strategic behavior may 
undermine a possible settlement.
Of course, the likelihood of strategic behavior precluding settlement would decrease if 
the parties were to reform their predictions about trial.  This could emerge from settlement 
discussions, as the negotiations may encourage a party who has assessed the likely result of trial 
110
 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at 555.
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inaccurately to correct her error.  But this will not always occur.  Here, too, strategic 
considerations pose a problem. 
Strategic behavior is particularly likely to prevent a change in predictions if, as often 
occurs, Penelope has information that Dwayne does not have and that she is reluctant to 
divulge.111  Perhaps Dwayne has testified at deposition that the traffic light at issue was the third 
of three lights in a row that he was able to cross without stopping.  Each, he claimed, was green 
when he arrived.  Penelope may do research and discover that the timing of the lights makes this 
impossible.  Either Dwayne’s recollection is faulty or he was driving at more than twice the 
speed limit.  Penelope may be optimistic about trial based in part on this information.  She may 
believe she can undermine his credibility.  This possibility gives rise to a strategic choice.  If she 
wants to settle on favorable terms, she should inform Dwayne of the flaw in his position.  
Disclosure, however, would provide Dwayne an opportunity to mitigate the damage from his 
testimony.  Penelope must make a decision—whether to tell Dwayne about his vulnerability to 
improve her position in negotiations or to remain silent and maximize the impact of her evidence 
before the finder of fact.  A decision not to disclose to Dwayne would make settlement difficult.
c.  Psychological Impediments to Settlement.
Further confounding efforts at settlement are various psychological considerations.  For 
example, Penelope may respond to Dwayne’s settlement offers by becoming more rather than 
less optimistic about trial.  A settlement offer that she would have found acceptable before 
entering into negotiations with Dwayne may not remain so once he makes it.  This is a 
111
 Asymmetric information is also generally recognized in the literature as a reason parties may fail to settle.  See 
Baird, Game Theory and the Law at 247-48.
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phenomenon called “reactive devaluation.”112  It reflects the tendency of disputants to be 
suspicious of any offer made by an opposing party.  If Dwayne makes an offer that Penelope 
thought in advance would be fair, Penelope might conclude that she has underestimated the 
strength of her case.  She may adjust her expectations and demand more.  This is just one form of 
suspicion that may undermine settlement efforts.  More generally, parties may be hampered by 
apprehensions about an unfair settlement.  They may in principle desire to settle for a reasonable 
amount, but fear being duped.113
These impediments to settlement are mutually reinforcing.  Disparate predictions about 
trial increase the odds that strategic behavior will impede negotiations and that negotiations will 
sow doubts in each party about the other’s good faith.  
Further, intervention by a third party without authority to bind the disputants may not 
suffice to reach a resolution.  A mediator may help to overcome the barriers to settlement.  But a 
party eager to get a fair result may not trust a mediator.  Mediators may at times be deceptive, 
privileging the successful resolution of a dispute over candor with the parties.114 For example, 
they may at times skew their appraisals of a case in an attempt to lower the expectations of one 
or more litigants.115  Parties in mediation are justified in suspecting that they cannot always rely 
on a mediator to be candid about the likely result at trial.  And even if a neutral party attempts in 
good faith to provide an objective assessment of the expected value of a case, a party who does 
not agree may simply reject the result as inaccurate.  
112
 See Richard Birke and Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 Harv. 
Negotiation L. Rev. 1, 48-49 & nn. 186-89 (1999).
113
 See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:  An Experimental 
Approach, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 107, 109-10, 142-50 (1994) (moral indignation about issues internal to settlement 
negotiations can prevent settlement).
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 For a candid and entertaining discussion of the deceptive practices of mediators see generally John W. Cooley, 
Mediation Magic:  Its Use and Abuse, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 1 (1997).
115
 See, e.g., Patrick E. Longan, Ethics in Settlement Negotiations:  Foreword, 52 Mercer L. Rev. 807, 835 (2001) 
(acknowledging potential temptation of mediator to mislead party about likely outcome of trial to secure settlement).
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d. EVA as a Solution.
EVA offers relief from the challenges to compromise created by divergent expectations, 
strategic behavior, and psychological barriers to settlement.  It does so by offering, in a sense, an 
objectively reasonable settlement, one that reflects the average strength of a case in court.
EVA eliminates the problem of divergent predictions.  The arbitrator makes an objective 
assessment of the likely results at trial.  That assessment is the only one that counts.  
EVA also allows the parties to avoid strategic behavior.  The arbitrator will award the 
expected value at trial.  No wrangling is necessary to determine how to allocate any savings 
between the parties.  Further, because the result of EVA is final, the parties have incentive to 
disclose all information favorable to their case.  
Further, parties unable to agree on a reasonable settlement may accept that resolving the 
dispute based on an objective assessment of the expected value of trial is fair. Each party will do 
as well as an objective party believes it would have done on average at trial.  Agreement on this 
standard is a way to get past psychological barriers to resolving the dispute.116
iii.  EVA Allows Parties to Insist on their Legal Rights without Facing the Risks of Trial.
EVA, then, is a way for litigants who cannot settle to avoid the risks of trial.  The same 
can be said of other forms of imposed compromise.  Yet EVA holds a potential advantage over 
the alternatives because it is respectful of legal rights in ways that other forms of imposed 
compromise are not.  In particular, EVA allows a party to secure an objective assessment of its 
right under the law.
a.  EVA Honors Legal Rights in a Way that Other Forms of Imposed Compromise Do Not.
116
 True, a party may conclude after-the-fact that the arbitrator was incorrect.  Overly optimistic parties may think 
they will do better in EVA than is realistic, just as they may have inaccurate expectations about trial.  But at some 
point disputants must cede control—a third party will ultimately resolve the dispute, whether through binding 
arbitration or trial.  So parties who cannot settle may well accept EVA.
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As compromises go, EVA shows particular deference to legal rights. This is so in part 
because it allows litigants to insist on receiving the benefit of their legal rights, while candidly 
recognizing that errors are possible in determining those rights.  Other forms of compromise do 
not honor legal rights in the same way. 
To see this, note the stark choice litigants currently face without EVA.  On one hand, 
they may resolve their disputes through trial or binding arbitration.  These forms of dispute 
resolution permit litigants to insist on their legal rights.  They can put their case before a 
decision-maker, who is to apply her best understanding of the law to her best understanding of 
the facts.  But, as noted above, these winner-take-all approaches to dispute resolution are risky 
and many litigants dislike risk.  
Alternatively, litigants may choose some other form of dispute resolution.  These choices 
are generally less risky than trial or binding arbitration because they involve some form of 
compromise.  Unlike EVA, however, they allow influences to creep into the dispute resolution 
process that have little to do with the evidence or the law.  Depending on the form of dispute 
resolution at issue, influences that are likely to inform the result include the strategic behavior of 
the parties, their interests, their values, and their psychological needs and desires.  
I do not mean to claim that formal legal rights are the only source of legitimacy in dispute 
resolution.  Indeed, we may find some additional influences are more suspect than others.  In a 
perfectly just world, skill as a negotiator, for example, might not affect the resolution of a 
dispute.117  In contrast, we may be more hesitant to conclude that the values embodied in the law 
are necessarily preferable to the private values of the parties as a basis for resolving the 
117
 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984); Edward Cooper, Work 
Product of the Rulemakers, 53 Minn.L.Rev. 1269-74 (1969).
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controversy between them.118 Still, trial enables parties to insist that a neutral decision-maker
shall assess the law and the evidence and impose a result accordingly.  For litigants to retain this 
right, and yet at the same time obtain a compromise, is a potential benefit of EVA.119
In this sense, EVA, like trial, is objective.  It provides an outcome that embodies a neutral 
assessment of the law and the evidence in a case.  In EVA, as at trial, disputants get the full 
benefit of the law, to the extent it can be discerned and applied by fallible human reckoning.  
EVA and trial differ only in their approaches to the possibility of error:  EVA reflects all of the 
possible conclusions that a court might reach, accepting the inevitability of enduring uncertainty; 
at trial, in contrast, a court chooses a single outcome that it believes is correct, although it knows 
that it may be mistaken.  Both, however, rely exclusively on the law and the evidence in 
rendering judgment.  
This is not true of the existing forms of imposed compromise.  To see this, it is 
worthwhile to review the forms of imposed compromise that currently exist.
Interest arbitration.  Perhaps the most common form of imposed compromise is interest 
arbitration.120  It is used frequently in labor disputes, particularly involving public employees 
who are forbidden by law to strike.121  When a disagreement arises over the terms of 
employment of police, for example, rather than risk an impasse that could result in a dangerous 
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strike, an arbitrator may be used to impose a fair result on management and employees.122
Interest arbitration, unlike EVA, imposes an outcome that compromises between the interests of 
the disputing parties rather than imposing an outcome dictated by their legal rights.   The parties 
get some of what they want rather than what the law entitles them to have.123  Interest arbitration 
does not reflect application of the law to the evidence.  It may produce a result at odds with the 
parties’ legal rights, if they have pertinent legal rights.124  Interest arbitration therefore does not 
necessarily reflect an objective view of the parties’ legal rights in the same way as trial and 
EVA.125
Final-Offer Arbitration.  Another form of dispute resolution that involves an imposed 
compromise is final-offer arbitration, at times called “baseball arbitration.”  Each party submits 
its preferred resolution of a dispute to an arbitrator, who must choose between them.126  The 
arbitrator is not permitted to devise her own preferred outcome.127  Each party has incentive to 
make concessions, for the arbitrator is to adopt whichever proposal is more reasonable.128
This approach is often used in resolving disputes over salaries between baseball players 
and teams.129  It can be employed as a substitute for litigation.  In such cases, like EVA, the 
outcome will reflect but not resolve legal and factual uncertainty.   
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A definite statement of how the arbitrator in fact chooses between the offers would be 
necessary to determine which possible ingredients of compromise will be reflected in the 
outcome.  Even when a statute prescribes decision-making criteria, however, arbitrators report 
that they generally do not feel obligated to adhere to them.130 As a result, there is no reason to 
assume the arbitrator will adopt any objective measure of the parties’ legal rights in choosing 
between the parties’ offers.  
In addition, the arbitrator must choose between the parties’ proposals.  She cannot render 
her own independent judgment of the right compromise, whatever her standard for identifying 
that result.  And many influences will affect the parties’ offers other than their assessments of 
their respective legal rights.  Strategic considerations may inform their offers, as may their 
interests or psychological needs and desires.  In particular, a party without information or 
resources may cede too much and may fare poorly if her proposal is selected.  Or an aggressive 
party may cede too little to have her proposal chosen, and end up with a worse result than might 
follow from an objective measure of a fair compromise.131  Because of these and other 
possibilities, one would not expect final-offer arbitration to embody solely an objective view of 
the parties’ legal rights.
A Wink and a Nod.  An imposed compromise also may occur in arbitration or trial.  
Many lawyers believe that arbitrators have more of a tendency than judges to “split the 
difference,” a phenomenon perhaps facilitated by the absence of an obligation on the part of 
130
 See, e.g., Meth, Final Offer Arbitration, 10 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. at 402 & n. 130 (citing James L. Stern & Joyce 
M. Najita, Lbr. Arb. Under Fire 125 (1997)) (noting study in which 15 of 22 arbitrators stated that statutory criteria 
had no effect on their decision) but see id. at 404 & n. 141 (citing Paul L. Burgess & Daniel R. Marburger, Do 
Negotiated and Arbitrated Salaries Differ Under Final-Offer Arbitration?, 46 Ind. and Lab. Rel. Rev. 548, 549 
(1993)) (suggesting arbitrators have incentive to adhere to decision criteria outlined by parties).
131
 See Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, and Samuel Merrill III, “Arbitration Procedures” in Negotiation Analysis 
55-56 (1991) (discussing strategy in formulating offers).
41
arbitrators to provide an explanation of their reasoning.132  Many observers also believe that 
juries will at times produce compromised verdicts.133  None of this is supposed to occur.  But 
when it does, imposed compromise comes with “a wink and nod.”
Because this sort of imposed compromise is not officially acknowledged, it is difficult to 
characterize.  If arbitrators seek a compromise, will they average what each party is seeking, base 
an award on how much they like each party, compromise in light of the strength of each party’s 
case, or attempt to satisfy the interests of each party or their perceived psychological needs and 
desires?  What will shape a jury’s compromise verdict, if that is the course it chooses?  In a given 
case, it will not generally be possible to answer these questions with confidence.  These vagaries 
mean that any implicit compromise that occurs in trial or arbitration is unlikely to be based 
exclusively on an objective view of the parties’ legal rights.  
The following chart reflects the distinctive nature of EVA as imposing compromise based 
on an objective assessment of the parties’ legal rights:
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Imposed Voluntary
Compromised EVA (objective view of rights)
Interest Arbitration (interests)
Baseball Arbitration (various ingredients)
A Wink and a Nod (mysterious ingredients)
Mediation
Settlement
Determined Trial
Traditional Binding Arbitration
?
Unlike existing forms of imposed compromise, EVA provides a compromise based 
exclusively on an objective assessment of the law and the evidence.  EVA simply avoids
choosing one—possibly erroneous—view of ambiguities in the law and the evidence. In this 
way, EVA is a form of compromise that honors the parties’ legal rights.  
Finally, it is important to note that use of proportionate damages in arbitration would not
allow parties to insist on their legal rights in the same way as EVA.  Instead, it would change the 
parties’ legal rights.  Whereas EVA embodies all of the possible outcomes in court, proportionate 
damages impose a compromise that varies from how any court would likely resolve a case and 
from how courts would do so on average.  As a result, some parties may resist arbitration that 
would award proportionate damages.  This would be true in particular of litigants who feel they 
would do better on average under the ordinary rules of trial.  Further, awarding proportionate 
damages changes the principles the law serves.  Its proponents take a particular view of the aims 
of the law, and make an argument that proportionate damages would serve those aims differently
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and more effectively than winner-take-all trial.134  They may well be right.  Still, awarding 
proportionate damages does not honor the prevailing legal regime in the same way as EVA. 
These points can be made more concrete through an analogy.  Toward this end, imagine a 
tennis tournament consisting of a series of matches between individuals.  In each match, the first 
player to win two sets is the victor.  The winner advances.  The loser is eliminated.  Each time a 
player wins a match, she is entitled to a larger prize.  The champion wins the most.  
Each match in this tournament is like a trial because it is winner-take-all.  Whether a 
player wins in straight sets or loses a single set makes no difference.  All that matters is which 
player wins.  Trial takes a similar approach.  If the court determines that the plaintiff probably 
should win, she gets her full remedy.  If the court thinks the best view is that she should lose, she 
gets nothing.  Any lack of confidence the court has about whether it has decided correctly has no 
influence on the amount of the plaintiff’s recovery.  
EVA is like offering each participant the expected value of her prize money from the 
tournament as predicted by an expert.  The expert would calculate the odds of a player winning 
each match in light of the different opponents the player will face.  Her recovery would reflect 
how she would fare on average.  As part of this process, the expert might ask to see some players 
play a few games against each other or to observe how a player is serving.  The expert would 
recognize, however, that having two players complete a match would produce only one possible 
outcome, not the result that would happen every time those two players compete.  
If players are averse to risk and have confidence in the expert, they might well choose to 
accept this average recovery.  This would be particularly likely if, say, the field were reduced to 
two finalists who would benefit greatly from an average payoff and do not care much for the 
134
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Compromise Verdicts, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 231, 264-86 (2001).
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marginal benefit of winning the greatest possible amount.  After all, only two players need agree 
to accept an expected value outcome and the players should do as well on average as they would 
by playing.  
Note that awarding prizes based on the expected value of playing retains the same notion 
of what it means to be the best tennis player:  the one most skilled at winning matches.  The 
expected value analysis just eliminates the risk intrinsic in tournament play.
Awarding proportionate damages, in contrast, would be like changing the rules so that the 
prizes in a tournament are based on the ratio of sets won to sets lost.  This is because 
proportionate damages calibrate a recovery to the likelihood that a plaintiff should win.  Doing 
so is similar to giving some credit to a player who wins a set but loses a match and taking some 
credit away from a player who wins a match but loses a set.  After all, in a sense a player’s loss 
of a set casts some doubt on whether she should have won the match.  Maybe she just got lucky.
Focusing on sets, rather than on matches, might well make for a better tennis tournament.  
Whether it would or would not, however, it would change what it means to be the best player:  in 
the original tournament, the strongest player is the one who wins the most matches, regardless of 
whether she sometimes loses sets; under the alternative approach, the best player is the one who 
wins the highest percentage of sets.  
As should be clear, the difference between proportionate damages and expected value can 
be significant.  Two points follow.  First, one of the parties is likely to fare worse on average 
under proportionate damages than a winner-take-all result.  This is a powerful reason for even a 
risk averse party to resist proportionate damages, especially if an expected value result is 
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available as an alternative.135  Second, proportionate damages change the nature of legal rights in 
a way that awarding the expected value of trial does not.  Proportionate damages alter what it 
means to be a prevailing party and, in some instances, who should prevail.  For example, under 
proportionate damages, a plaintiff may win a recovery commensurate with the odds a defendant 
caused her injury, even though she would have won nothing in a winner-take-all system.  This is 
akin to modifying what it means to be the best tennis player in a tournament.  It does not defer to 
the prevailing legal regime in the same way as EVA.136
b. EVA Should Assist Vulnerable Litigants to Pursue their Legal Rights.
The power of EVA to allow parties to secure their legal rights may have its greatest 
impact on vulnerable litigants.  Vulnerable members of society lack the resources—money, 
connections, or knowledge—necessary to protect themselves. They suffer frequent violations of
their legal rights precisely because no repercussions will likely follow.  When vulnerable 
members of society are victims, they may not know what their rights are or may lack the means 
to vindicate them.  Alternatively, when they are accused, they are often unable to defend 
themselves properly.137
Notable among the challenges vulnerable litigants face is risk aversion.138  EVA should 
ameliorate their plight because, as discussed above, it decreases the risks of litigation. A 
vulnerable plaintiff who is considering filing a lawsuit may dread even a remote possibility of 
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losing outright and owing her attorney’s fees and costs.  For this reason, a potential plaintiff may 
not prosecute a case that would lead to a winner-take-all result  or may settle for an amount 
significantly less than the expected value of trial.139  EVA, however, may remove any 
meaningful chance of a net loss, enabling the plaintiff to pursue litigation.  Alternatively, a 
vulnerable defendant may be so averse to an extreme loss that he will agree to pay more than he 
would lose on average at trial.  By eliminating any meaningful possibility of an anomalously 
unfavorable result, EVA may allow this defendant to seek an imposed result if a plaintiff is 
overreaching in settlement negotiations.  Because EVA tends to produce more certain recoveries 
for plaintiffs and less extreme losses for defendants, it should increase the ability of vulnerable 
members of society to pursue their legal rights.
A tricky issue for this argument is whether powerful parties will be willing to enter into 
EVA.  Litigants with ample resources, too, are apt to be averse to risk.  They may be less so than 
litigants with lesser resources.  Nevertheless, even large capital markets do not like uncertainty.  
As a result, powerful parties are likely to prefer expected value outcomes to winner-take-all trial.  
For this reason, they are likely to prefer EVA to trial, if those are their only choices.
This qualification, however, is important because EVA and trial are not the only options.  
Powerful parties may reject EVA precisely because they can use the threat of trial to extract a 
settlement on favorable terms from vulnerable litigants.  The greater tolerance powerful litigants 
have for the risks and costs of litigation, the greater their strategic advantage in negotiations. 
Since most cases settle, powerful parties may refuse to enter EVA because it would deprive them 
of bargaining power.
A second reason powerful parties may insist on trial is to deter future litigation.  This is a 
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likely strategy for an entity frequently involved in legal disputes.  Common examples include 
employers of large numbers of workers, manufacturers of consumer goods, and insurance 
companies.  Agreeing to Expected Value Arbitration in, for example, a dispute over the alleged 
wrongful termination of an employee may encourage later litigation.  Other employees may file 
suit in the hope that the employer will again agree to enter EVA.  Precisely because employees 
may prefer EVA to trial, employers may reject it.
Even when powerful parties are averse to risk, then, they may reject EVA because trial is 
not their only alternative.  Refusing to enter EVA may result in a settlement favorable to a 
powerful party or may prevent lawsuits altogether.
On the other hand, where disparities between the parties in terms of their tolerance to the 
risks and costs of litigation are small, they are particularly likely to agree on EVA.  Moreover, 
even where those disparities are large, evidence suggests EVA will be attractive in some 
instances.  Dynamics somewhat similar to those in EVA occur in traditional binding arbitration.  
It, too, is perceived as yielding less extreme results than trial.140  As a result, it should deprive 
powerful parties of bargaining power in negotiations and of a deterrent to potential litigation. 
Yet many powerful parties choose to resolve disputes through binding arbitration.141  Arbitration 
clauses are common, for example, in employment and insurance contracts.142  Perhaps when 
powerful parties tally up the advantages and disadvantages, they will also be amenable to EVA
in some cases.  Powerful parties in particular may choose EVA in pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses.  They may be willing to agree to arbitration in general and thereby protect 
themselves from exposure to great losses in a few cases, even if that means empowering 
140
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individual litigants in large numbers of cases who have relatively small claims.  So EVA may 
help vulnerable litigants to insist on their legal rights and yet still be attractive to powerful 
litigants.
B. Minimizing Errors. 
 Another feature of EVA that is potentially attractive is that it would result in relatively 
small errors.  This claim is most straightforward when it comes to possible errors in interpreting 
the evidence.  In this regard, academics and judges have tended to discuss two goals:  (1) 
minimizing expected error costs,143 or the average difference between the actual and the correct 
result in litigation; and (2) avoiding the largest errors that a rule for resolving disputes tends to 
produce in individual cases.144
By both measures, EVA performs well.  It should generally produce the same expected 
error costs as trial and lower expected error costs than proportionate damages.145  Also, EVA 
should avoid the largest errors that would occur at trial.
Commentators have focused less on errors of law.146  This is true, I believe, for at least 
two reasons, which are probably related:  first, philosophical issues complicate the notion of a 
correct interpretation of the law147 and, second, courts do not generally incorporate in their 
interpretation of the law any consideration of the likelihood of error.148 Nevertheless, if one 
posits plausible measures of legal error, EVA performs similarly well.
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i.  EVA Should Result in Relatively Small Errors in Assessing the Evidence.
a.  Minimizing Expected Error Costs in Assessing the Evidence.
Scholars attempting to quantify accuracy in adjudication have taken recourse to expected 
error costs.  Expected error costs may be defined as the average difference between the actual 
result and the right result in a case.149  Scholars have generally assumed that accuracy is 
desirable and that small expected error costs are preferable to large expected error costs.  
The dispute between Penelope and Dwayne provides a useful illustration of an analysis of 
expected error costs.  Assume the version of the hypothetical involving Penelope and Dwayne in 
which Wanda will testify that she believes that Dwayne was at fault.  Recall that the best view of 
the evidence is that the odds are 70% that Dwayne ran a red light and 30% that Penelope ran a 
red light.  We assumed that this would translate into a 90% chance that Penelope would win 
$100,000 at trial.
This information suffices to calculate the expected error costs of trial.  First, there is a 
70% chance that Penelope should prevail.  If she should win, there is a ninety percent chance that 
the jury will correctly decide in her favor.  No error will when she wins.  There is also a ten 
percent chance that the jury will err by denying her a recovery.  The size of that error would be 
$100,000 because Penelope should win that amount but she will recover nothing.  Second, there 
is a 30% chance that Penelope should lose.  If so, there is a ninety percent chance of the jury 
erring by awarding her $100,000 when she should not recover at all.  There is also a ten percent 
chance that the jury will be correct and decide against her.  This combination of odds and errors 
149
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can be expressed in the following formula for the expected error costs from trial:  .70 x (.90 x $0 
+ .10 x $100,000) + .30 x (.90 x $100,000 + .10 x $0) = $34,000.
The expected error costs are the same in EVA.  An arbitrator in EVA should award the 
expected value of the case.  The expected value of the outcome at trial is calculated by 
multiplying the odds that Penelope will prevail by the amount she will recover if she does:  .90 x 
$100,000 = $90,000.  The expected error costs can then be calculated.  First, there is a 70% 
chance that Penelope should win.  If so, Penelope should recover $100,000 but she will recover 
only $90,000.  This will lead to an error of $10,000.  Second, there is a 30% chance that 
Penelope will lose.  If so, Penelope should recover nothing but she will receive $90,000.  The 
error costs, then, are $90,000.  The formula for the expected error costs is:  .70 x ($100,000 -
$90,000) + .30 x ($90,000 - $0) = $34,000.
In this instance, the expected error costs from trial and EVA are the same.  Indeed, this 
will always be true, if the arbitrator is accurate in predicting the expected outcome of trial. 150
The reason is that EVA entails an award that on average will be the same as trial.  On average, 
the award in trial and in EVA will vary by the same amount from the correct result.  
The standard proposal for imposed compromise—proportionate damages—yields higher 
expected error costs than trial and EVA.  To see this, recall that under proportionate damages the 
award is the product of the likelihood that the plaintiff is right and the amount she should recover 
if she is.  In this case, Penelope would receive 70% of $100,000, or $70,000. 
The expected error costs for proportionate damages are calculated in much the same way
as for trial or EVA.  First, there is a 70% chance that Penelope should win.  If so, Penelope 
should recover $100,000 but she will recover only $70,000.  Second, there is a 30% chance that 
150
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Penelope will lose.  If so, Penelope should recover nothing but she will receive $70,000.  The 
formula for the expected error costs is:  .70 x ($100,000 - $70,000) + .30 ($70,000 - $0) = 
$42,000.  This is higher than for trial or EVA.  David Kaye has shown that this will generally be 
true: trial (and, I would add, EVA) will produce lower expected error costs than proportionate 
damages.151
EVA, then, performs as well as trial, and better than proportionate damages, at 
minimizing the expected error costs from dispute resolution.
b. Avoiding Large Errors in Assessing the Evidence.
Expected error costs are not the only way to measure the harm from errors caused by a 
standard for resolving disputes.  Another consideration is the size of errors when they occur.  
Scholars have suggested that a large error is more significant than numerous small errors, even if 
they result in the same average error.152
Support for this view comes from the aversion most people have for risk in litigation.  If 
Penelope will suffer greater harm from losing when she should win than she would from winning 
a small amount when she should win a large amount, then the average size of the errors does not 
capture the harm from errors.  The same is true for Dwayne if he would prefer a certain but 
relatively small loss to taking a chance on winning but at a risk of suffering a very large loss.  In 
both instances, a relatively small average error may mask the true extent of harm when there is 
the possibility for a very large error.
Scholars promoting imposed compromise have made this point.  They have contended 
151
 David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:  Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence 
and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 487.  Saul Levmore has pointed out that this will not 
necessarily be true for certain cases involving recurring wrongs.  Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, 
Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691, 704-05 (1990).  He provides good reason to adopt a 
proportionate damages approach in some circumstances.
152 See, e.g., Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence 
Standard, U. Penn. L. Rev. 1159, 1163-68 (1983).
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that imposing proportionate damages may be better than the winner-take-all outcomes of trial, 
even if proportionate damages produce larger expected error costs.153  This is in part because the 
errors from proportionate damages tend not to be as large as the most extreme errors at trial.154
From this perspective, EVA offers an attractive combination of characteristics.  As noted, 
EVA produces the same expected error costs as trial and lower expected error costs than 
proportionate damages.  Meanwhile, EVA, like proportionate damages, also tends to eliminate 
the largest of errors.  It produces errors in more situations than trial, but the errors tend to be 
smaller.  So, for example, assume Penelope should recover $100,000 if Dwayne was at fault and 
nothing if he was not at fault and the odds are 90% that Penelope will win.  EVA will award her 
$90,000.  This means that the largest error will be of $90,000, when Penelope should lose.  Trial, 
in contrast, will sometimes award Penelope nothing when she should win and at other times will 
award her $100,000 when she should lose.  The largest error will be of $100,000.  EVA, like 
proportionate damages, errs more often than trial, but not by as large a margin as trial in 
particular cases. 155
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 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691 
(1990); Orloff & Stedinger, Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, U. Penn. L. Rev. at 1163-68.
154
 See, e.g., Orloff & Stedinger, Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, U. Penn. L. Rev. at 1163-68.
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 A possible qualification of this point is that proportionate damages may tend to yield even smaller errors than 
EVA in particular cases.  Whether this is so depends on the relationship between the likelihood that the plaintiff 
should win and the likelihood that the plaintiff will win.  A plausible intuition is that in close cases, the two 
probabilities will be about the same.  If the likelihood that a party should win hovers around fifty percent, then the 
odds that a court will find in favor of the party may also approximate fifty percent.  As the balance of evidence tips 
in one party’s favor, however, the odds of that party prevailing may shift even more quickly.  Thus, we said above 
that if Penelope has a 70% chance of being right, it may be that 90% of juries would find in her favor.  For a view 
along these lines see Compromise Verdicts, 89 Calif. L. Rev. at 241-42.  If this relationship generally holds true, 
which is an empirical question, then the errors may diverge and tend to be smaller in awarding proportionate 
damages than in awarding the expected value of trial.  Indeed, one can make a more formal statement by relying on 
a measure of error that weighs large errors more heavily than small errors.  One such approach seeks to minimize the 
square of the error in each case.  See Orloff & Stedinger, at 1165-68; Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, 
Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691, 704-05 (1990); Abramowicz, 89 Calif. L. Rev. at 247.  
Using this approach, awarding proportionate damages minimizes the harm from errors in litigation.  See Appendix 
III for a proof of this claim.  If assessed accurately by an arbitrator, proportionate damages will produce smaller 
errors by this measure than EVA.
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EVA, then, performs better than trial and similarly to proportionate damages at avoiding 
the most extreme errors in particular cases.156
ii. EVA May Minimize Errors in Assessing the Law.
Scholars have spent less time discussing imposing compromise based on potential legal 
errors than on potential factual errors.157  This may be because courts acknowledge the 
possibility of error in finding facts.  The burden of persuasion is premised on the notion that 
stochastic reckoning is necessary in addressing conflicting evidence.  A jury is not to find the 
right facts, just the facts that satisfy a specified likelihood of being right.  The same is not true 
for the law.  Judges do not acknowledge uncertainty about the law in the same way.  
The absence of an acknowledgement of legal uncertainty in decision-making may reflect, 
in part, philosophical doubts about whether there are right answers to contested legal questions.  
Facts—at least certain kinds of facts—seem to be objectively right or wrong.  Either the light 
was red for Dwayne or it was red for Penelope.158  When it comes to the law—or to 
determinations in general that involve value judgments—there is no physical reality to provide 
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 This analysis does not exhaust the possible understandings of the goal of minimizing legal errors.  Abramowicz 
points out, as have others before him, that the goal of minimizing errors is merely instrumental, serving as a means 
to minimize social losses.  See Abramowicz at 248 (citing Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 117 
n. 12 (1987); V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth:  Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 807, 
815-16 (1961); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection, 97 Harv. L. Rev.  at 874 n. 98).  Abramowicz notes that a 
rule that minimizes average errors could result, for example, in a single manufacturer being held liable for all harm 
from its own and its competitors’ products in market share liability.  Id. at 249.  Saul Levmore has similarly 
identified various classes of cases in which social losses may result from attempting to minimize errors based on the 
evidence that the parties present.  See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 
19 J. Legal Stud. 691 (1990).  These include cases in which one of the parties had the opportunity to create evidence 
that would have prevented factual ambiguity, id. at 694-95, cases in which the same parties are participants in a 
series of disputes, id. at 697-98, and cases in which plaintiffs or defendants will always lose under a rule that 
minimizes errors.  Id. at 715-21.  The situations discussed by Abramowicz and Levmore, however, are exceptional.  
In general, it would seem that minimizing the average error in cases and the size of errors when they occur will tend 
to minimize social costs.  I therefore focus on these two general measures of error.  Moreover, note that 
proportionate damages and EVA are not mutually exclusive.  Proportionate damages, much like any other standard, 
is susceptible to application in EVA.
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 But see Schwartz and Beckner, Toward a Theory of the “Meritorious Case”: Legal Uncertainty as a Social 
Choice Problem, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 801, 804-05, n. 10 (1998).
158 See Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 187, 195 (1993) (citations 
omitted) (reviewing Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity (1992)).  
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an obvious independent grounding for the notions of correct and incorrect.159
Still, we ask judges to do their best to decide legal questions properly.  To do that, they 
exercise their best judgment in interpreting the law, using whatever method of interpretation they 
believe most defensible.  The same faculty that allows for a choice among competing 
interpretations of the law should allow for an assessment of the odds that an interpretation may 
be incorrect.160
Assuming we accept this understanding of errors in interpreting the law for the purpose 
of comparing different standards for resolving disputes, the issue then becomes how to measure 
the likelihood of legal errors.  One straightforward way would be to use the same approach as 
with the possibility of errors in assessing the evidence.  We might distinguish the odds that a 
party should win on a legal issue from the odds that a party will win.  A form of proportionate 
damages could award a recovery to the plaintiff according to the chances she should win, 
whereas EVA would award a recovery in proportion to the odds that she will win at trial.  The 
analysis of legal errors would then be much the same as for errors in finding the facts.  Trial and 
EVA would result in the same expected error costs in interpreting the law,161 which would be 
lower than the expected error costs for proportionate damages.162  EVA and proportionate 
damages would tend to avoid the largest errors at trial.163  EVA fares quite well.
An alternative would be to treat the likelihood a plaintiff will win on a legal issue as the 
same as the likelihood that the plaintiff should win on the legal issue.  A possible justification for 
this approach would be that consensus is the best measure of what is right when it comes to 
159
 Id. at 195 & n. 31.
160
 For an elaboration of this argument see Joshua P. Davis, Taking Uncertainty Seriously:  Revising Injunction 
Doctrine, 34 Rutgers L.J. 363, 424-26 (2003).
161
 See Appendix I for the formal proof.
162
 See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:  Justifiably Naked Statistical 
Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 487.
163
 See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
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contested legal issues.164 In other words, the stronger the consensus there is behind a result, the 
greater its likelihood of being correct.165
Whatever the rationale, this approach suggests a somewhat different analysis of legal 
error.  The distinction between EVA and proportionate damages collapses.  The only contrast is 
with trial.  It turns out that EVA and trial have the same expected error costs, 166 while EVA (and 
proportionate damages) will tend to avoid the most extreme errors of trial in individual cases. 
Again, an illustration is useful.  In the case of Penelope and Dwayne, a knotty legal issue 
might determine liability.  Penelope’s only significant injury may be the increased probability of 
suffering some disease in the future—perhaps she crashed into a toxic container and was exposed 
to a substance that may cause her to develop cancer some day.  Assume the legal controversy is 
about whether she may recover now for the pain and suffering from fear of the possibility of 
cancer in her future. 167  Let’s say that the odds are 60% that she will, and therefore should, win 
on this legal issue and recover $100,000.  In other words, we assume a sixty percent chance of a 
ruling in the plaintiff’s favor translates into a sixty percent chance that she is right.  
One issue is which standard for decision-making produces lower expected error costs.  
The expected error costs that follow from imposing expected value and all-or-nothing outcomes 
are the same.  To see this, consider the example of Penelope and Dwayne.  At trial Penelope will 
win $100,000 sixty percent of the time and nothing forty percent of the time.  There is a sixty 
percent chance that Penelope winning is the right result and a forty percent chance that it is the 
164
 This is consistent with Abramowicz’ working definition of the right result on a legal issue in Michael 
Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1602 (2000).  
165
 See Brian Leiter, Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 187, 192 (1993) (citations 
omitted) (reviewing Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity (1992)) (discussing minimal objectivism).
166
 For a proof of this claim see Appendix II.
167 See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Ayers, __ U.S. __, 123 S.Ct. 1210 (2003) (allowing recovery in these 
circumstances).
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wrong result.  The expected error costs are captured in the following formula:  .60 x (.40 x. 
$100,000) + .40 x (.60 x. $100,000) = $48,000.  
Under EVA, Penelope will recover $60,000.  If Penelope should win, she should recover 
the full $100,000.  There is a sixty percent chance, then, that her recovery will be too little by 
$40,000.  If she should lose, on the other hand, she should receive nothing.  There is a forty 
percent chance, then, that her recovery will be too much by $60,000.  The overall error is 
$40,000 x .6 + $60,000 x .4, or $48,000.  The expected error is the same in EVA as at trial.
This relationship holds true generally.  EVA and trial produce the same expected error 
costs if the odds of a plaintiff winning on a legal question are the same as the odds of the plaintiff 
being right.168
A second issue is whether EVA or trial will produce the largest errors.  As noted above, 
EVA tends to split the difference, if you will, so that neither party gains the full benefit of a 
favorable interpretation of the law but when errors occur, they are only a portion of the full 
measure of the plaintiffs’ potential recovery. As with errors regarding the facts, legal errors will 
not be as large in EVA as the most extreme errors at trial.
iii. Minimizing Adjudicative Errors Should Promote Efficiency.
One way to understand the goal of minimizing errors is through the prism of law and 
economics.  Economists recognize that any form of dispute resolution will at times be inaccurate. 
Inaccuracies can result in inefficiencies. In particular, if the rules in a legal system are designed 
to encourage efficient conduct when applied properly, then some parties predicting possible 
errors in adjudication will have incentive to engage in inefficient conduct or not to engage in 
efficient conduct.
168 See Appendix II for the proof.
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Of course, legal rules can be developed with the prospect of errors in mind.  No doubt 
this sometimes occurs.  But an economic analysis of the law becomes impractical without the use 
of simplifying assumptions.  One very common simplifying assumption is that legal rules should 
be designed to encourage efficient conduct if courts interpret the law properly and apply it to the 
actual facts of a case. 169  Procedural rules then can be formulated with an eye to minimizing the 
distortion created by errors in the adjudicatory process.  Economists generally follow this 
approach.  Indeed, if legal rules were perfectly formulated taking into account the possibility of 
errors, any proposals for improving accuracy in adjudication would have to be rejected as 
disruptive of the perfectly efficient incentives in place.  Economists have not generally adopted 
this odd position. 170
This understanding of the rationale from law and economics for minimizing errors 
suggests how those errors should be defined.  The goal of the law is to encourage efficient 
behavior when it is applied to the actual behavior of the parties.  A mischaracterization of the 
parties’ behavior—or, to be more precise, the anticipated possibility of a mischaracterization of 
that behavior—will create undesirable incentives.  Errors of fact occur, then, when the court’s 
findings are inconsistent with what actually occurred.  Similarly, an interpretation of the law is 
correct if it will create incentives for efficient conduct.  Errors of law occur when judges deviate 
from this goal.  Finally, mixed questions of fact and law, or factual issues that entail value 
judgments, like whether a person acted negligently,171 hold the potential for both kinds of error.
169
 Richard Posner’s work is typical, identifying accuracy in adjudication as one of the aims of the design of the 
rules governing litigation.  See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, § 21.2, at 549, 550 n.2; Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. rev. 1477, 1480-87 (1999).
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 Id.
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 See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts:  The 
Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S.Cal. L. Rev. 235 (1991).
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With these definitions in place, it makes sense that a primary focus of economists has 
been to minimize the average size of the errors adjudication will produce.  In this regard, EVA 
performs quite well.  As noted above, EVA should produce the same average errors as trial.  It 
also should produce smaller errors on average than proportionate damages, the most prevalent 
proposal from imposing compromise.
Economists have also been concerned at times with the largest errors that adjudication 
will produce.  The size of errors may matter because large errors are particularly likely to 
influence the behavior of disputants who are averse to risk.  Large potential errors are likely to 
have a particularly significant distorting effect on the behavior of risk- averse disputants.172  As a 
result, an economist is likely to prefer the relatively small errors that EVA produces to the larger, 
if less frequent, errors that occur at trial.
C. Encouraging Desirable Expenditures on Litigation. 
Another potentially attractive feature of EVA is that it creates desirable incentives to 
invest in litigation.  Of course, this tends to be true of all arbitration.  A common reason for 
parties to arbitrate is to reduce litigation costs.  And EVA, like other forms of arbitration, can be 
less formal than litigation leading up to trial and, therefore, may be less expensive than trial.  
But the incentives EVA creates for expenditures on litigation are attractive in another 
way.  In contrast to trial and winner-take-all arbitration, EVA will encourage risk-averse parties 
to invest in litigation173 if and only if doing so will provide them a net gain on average.174 One 
would expect these incentives generally to obtain in EVA, because EVA should be attractive 
172
 This is consistent with Steven Shavell’s point that the concern of economists should not be minimizing errors as 
an end in itself, but as a means to avoid discouraging efficient behavior or encouraging efficient behavior.  See 
Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & Econ. 587, 605-06 & 
n. 28 (1985).
173
 I use the term litigation here to include the process leading up to a decision in EVA and other forms of 
arbitration.
174
 For a formal proof of this claim, with some limiting assumptions, see Appendix IV.
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primarily to risk-averse litigants.  Disputants who seek risk should prefer trial or winner-take-all 
arbitration to EVA.175
Assuming disputants are averse to risk, EVA should have two different effects depending 
on the circumstances of the litigants.  First, some parties will have incentive in trial to make 
expenditures that will yield a net loss on average in dollars.  They will do so to avoid the risk of 
an extremely unfavorable result.  They will not have incentive to make these expenditures in 
EVA.  For these disputants, EVA should be less costly than trial.
At other times, parties will be unwilling to make investments in litigation leading to trial 
even though doing so would benefit them on average.  The reason is that they are particularly 
averse to adding to the harm they will suffer from an exceptionally bad result at trial.  EVA 
spares parties with reasonably strong legal positions from the daunting risk that the costs they 
incur will exacerbate an extremely unfavorable result.  By minimizing this risk, EVA creates 
incentives for parties to make investments that produce a net gain on average in dollars.  It also 
should help plaintiffs to file meritorious cases that risk aversion would prevent them from 
bringing if trial would determine their recovery. 
i.  Some Parties Should Spend Less in EVA than Trial.
Some parties should spend less in EVA than trial.  The intuition behind this claim is 
simple.  Parties who are averse to risk tend to avoid the possibility of an exceptionally bad result.  
At times, they will invest to protect against that risk, even if on average doing so will produce a 
net loss.  This resembles purchasing insurance.176
175
 A possible exception would be parties who agree to EVA through a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause.  I 
do not explore the incentives to invest in litigation if a party in EVA is risk-seeking.
176
 The analogy to insurance is not perfect.  A standard model for insurance involves a relatively small but certain 
loss, and protects against a large loss that is unlikely.  Investing in litigation, in contrast, does not guarantee that a 
large loss will not occur, but rather decreases its likelihood.  Moreover, unlike insurance, an investment in litigation 
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Trial tends to produce polar results.  A party is likely to win everything or nothing.177
Any marginal expenditure may cause a swing from one extreme result to another.  Under these 
circumstances, a party may expend money to protect against an unfavorable swing in result, even 
if the expenditure will result in a net loss on average.
EVA, in contrast, produces a continuum of results.  With EVA, expenditures in litigation 
will have only an incremental effect one way or the other on the plaintiff’s recovery.178  To a risk 
averse party, a small improvement in the prospect of avoiding an extremely unfavorable result 
may be worth more than a great likelihood of improving the outcome by a small amount, even if 
the two correlate to precisely the same change in expected value in dollars.  As a result, some 
risk averse parties will spend less in Expected Value Arbitration than trial.179
a.  An Example of a Party Spending Less in EVA than Trial.
Once again, the dispute between Penelope and Dwayne provides a useful example.  
Assume Dwayne acknowledges that he ran the red light.  Fault is not at issue.  The source of 
will increase the size of the large loss if it transpires, even if only by a relatively small amount.  As a result, in some 
circumstances, risk aversion could provide a defendant a reason not to invest in litigation.  
Take a somewhat fanciful example, although one with a real point behind it.  Bill Gates might have 
$100,005,000,000.  In litigation, he might be exposed to a loss of up to $100,000,000,000.  Litigation of this 
magnitude could easily cost millions of dollars.  Yet this might be money he would be reluctant to spend because if 
trial yields a loss of $100,000,000,000, every dollar beyond that will be dear to him.  I am grateful to Morton Davis 
for this example.  It supports the general idea that, under some circumstances, risk aversion could lead a defendant 
to spend less in litigation leading to trial than in EVA.
177 Of course, this is not always so.  Comparative negligence, as opposed to contributory negligence, is apt to 
produce results along a continuum in a manner similar to EVA.  The argument in the text about EVA therefore has 
important implications for choosing between the rules of comparative and contributory negligence in tort.
178 Note that the variation in the incentives to spend should not be the result of any difference in the plaintiff’s 
average recovery.  By definition, Expected Value Arbitration seeks to award the average recovery in trial.
179
 Winner-take-all trial will not necessarily involve polar results.  In this sense, the term may at times be a 
misnomer.  It is winner-take-all because the decision-maker is to resolve uncertainty.  In some instances, however, 
the results of trial may fall along a continuum.  A notable example is comparative liability.  Under that doctrine, the 
finder of fact is supposed to decide how much fault should be assigned to a plaintiff and a defendant.  See Black’s 
Law Dictionary 282 (6th ed. 1991).  Fault is treated as a matter of degree.  Much like in EVA, a little more evidence 
or a slightly more compelling closing argument is likely to have only an incremental effect on the plaintiff’s 
recovery.  Whenever the outcomes of trial are continuous in this way, the expenditure on litigation by risk averse 
litigants will be different from when the results are polar. Courts and scholars have not explored this justification 
for the shift from contributory negligence to comparative negligence.  
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contention is the issue of damages.  Assume Penelope’s only significant injury after the accident 
is a balance disorder.  It is debilitating.  She claims a causal link to her collision with the 
telephone pole.  Further assume that Penelope has a 20 % chance of prevailing on causation and 
recovering $400,000, for an expected value of $80,000.  
If Dwayne is risk- neutral, he will be indifferent between an expected value award of 
$80,000 and taking a chance on resolution of the issue at trial.  This indifference would translate 
into similar expenditures in preparing for trial and for EVA.  
To see this, assume that the parties have done most of the legal and factual work to go to 
trial when a new study is released that bears on the crucial issue of causation.  The study may 
shed some light on the etiology of balance disorders, allowing for an assessment of whether the 
car accident caused Penelope’s difficulties.  Each party must decide whether to pay for an expert 
analysis of the new study.
To keep the example simple, assume that Dwayne has only two viable options:  to ignore 
the new study and pay litigation expenses of $25,000 through trial or to secure an expert analysis 
of the study for an additional $25,000, which will bring his total expenses to $50,000.  These 
choices correlate to different likelihoods of prevailing.  Dwayne may conclude, for example, that 
spending $25,000 on the analysis decreases the likelihood of Penelope recovering by five 
percent.  In other words, Dwayne must choose whether to pay for the additional report and 
decrease the odds of Penelope’s success from twenty to fifteen percent.  Further assume that 
Dwayne’s decision is unaffected by whether Penelope will invest in a similar expert analysis.180
180
 This is an important limitation.  Interactions between how the parties spend can have profound effects and are not 
easy to model.  Dwayne should, of course, consider Penelope’s likely investment strategy in formulating his own.  
Doing so would require him to evaluate whether the marginal gain from his own investment will vary depending on 
how much she invests.  Thus, whether Dwayne’s predictions and assessments of Penelope’s investment in litigation 
should affect his own will depend in part on the circumstances.  Exploring this issue is beyond this scope of this 
Article.
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If Dwayne is risk neutral, he will not pay for the expert analysis whether preparing for 
trial or EVA.  The benefit of the expert analysis would be to decrease by five percent the chance 
that Penelope will recover $400,000.  The expected value of the investment is worth five percent 
of $400,000, or .05 x $400,000 = $20,000, an amount that is less than the cost of the analysis.  
This means that in trial, Dwayne would be paying $25,000 for a decrease in his liability worth on 
average $20,000, and in Expected Value Arbitration, Dwayne would be paying $25,000 for a 
loss that is $20,000 less than would otherwise result.  The investment is not economical.  
Matters are quite different if Dwayne is averse to risk.  If he is, he may be highly 
motivated to minimize the risk of losing a large sum.  Dwayne may, for example, be uninsured.  
His assets and income may permit him to pay up to, say, $160,000, but beyond that amount a 
loss would affect him significantly.  He might have difficulty paying his mortgage or rent.  For 
this reason, he might well pay $25,000 for the expert analysis in preparation for trial.  He cannot 
afford to take a chance that he will lose $400,000.  In a sense, the expert analysis for him is like 
insurance.  He is willing to spend more than his expected return to decrease the odds of a 
catastrophic loss.  
In EVA, in contrast, he might conclude that the difference in the outcome would vary 
along a continuum.   Given the odds, he would anticipate an award around $80,000.  He might 
not suffer terribly if it increased by ten or twenty thousand dollars.  Moreover, paying for the 
expert analysis should result in a net loss on average and may not make the outcome of EVA any 
more predictable.  In this case, Dwayne should refrain from spending money on the expert 
analysis if, on average, it would cost more than it is worth.  EVA protects Dwayne from the kind 
of dire consequences that would warrant insurance. 
b.  Utility Curves and a More Formal Analysis.
63
In providing a somewhat more formal analysis of the idea that parties at times should 
expend less in EVA than trial, a useful concept is the utility curve.  Utility curves are a way of 
describing a person’s preferences in light of her attitude toward risk.  They allow a more 
systematic expression of why risk averse defendants may spend less in litigating to continuous 
results than to discontinuous results.  
This point is important in that it reveals a potential virtue of EVA.  It also has broader
implications, providing what may be an as-of-yet unexplored benefit of adopting legal rules that 
produce continuous results rather than discontinuous and polar results: all else remaining 
constant, legal rules that produce continuous results may discourage investments in litigation that 
yields a net loss on average in dollars.  This could help to support the shift, for example, to 
comparative liability from contributory negligence, which many jurisdictions have now 
undertaken.181
Utility is a mythical creature.  It relies on a few basic assumptions about people’s 
preferences, assumptions that are quite plausible and yet, as empirical work has shown, that are 
untrue in many circumstances.182  Nevertheless, used with caution the concept of utility can cast 
some light on how people are likely to behave.
Utility is a way of defining a person’s relative preferences in numerical terms.  Each state 
of affairs can be assigned a certain number of “utils,” which one might interpret as meaning that 
a state of affairs brings that person a certain amount of satisfaction or pleasure or allows that 
person to avoid a certain amount of dissatisfaction or displeasure.  Assigning two different states 
181
 See Lisa R. Smith, A Dollars and Sense Approach to Partial Settlements:  Judicial Application of the Gross 
Damages Method, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1147, 1147 & n. 3 (1987) (reporting that by 1987 a majority of jurisdictions had 
adopted some form of comparative negligence).
182
 For example, utility theory cannot account for framing—a phenomenon, confirmed by empirical studies, in which 
people’s attitudes regarding risk will vary depending on whether they perceive a change in their financial situation 
as a gain or a loss.  See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry:  The Regret Aversion Theory, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
43, 57 & nn. 63-64 (discussing prospect theory of risk aversion).
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of affairs the same number of utils is a way of saying that a person is indifferent between them.  
Moreover, one may assume that a person’s preferences are transitive, that is, if the person prefers 
state of affairs A to B, and state of affairs B to C, the person should prefer state of affairs A to C.  
Finally, Von Neumann has shown, given these and a few other plausible assumptions, that a 
person will value equally a chance of benefiting by a certain number of utils and the guarantee of 
receiving the expected value of that chance measured in utils.  In other words, the person will be 
indifferent between a fifty percent chance of benefiting by 50 utils and a guarantee of benefiting 
by 25 utils.183
One way to depict utility is through a graph of a utility function.  A utility function is a 
formula that compares the utility of different states of affairs.  A useful function correlates a 
party’s utils to having various sums of money.  
For the risk-neutral party, who values each dollar equally, a simple utility curve can be 
constructed.  It is linear.  It can be expressed by setting one dollar equal to a set numbers of utils.  
Each additional dollar that a plaintiff expects to receive or a defendant to pay will change the 
party’s well-being equally.  The following graph depicts the preferences of a risk-neutral 
defendant.
183
 For a general discussion of this understanding of utility see Morton D. Davis, Game Theory: A Nontechnical 
Introduction 62-65 (1970).
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The hypothetical utility curve of Dwayne allows for another illustration of these points.  
Consider a plausible description of Dwayne’s preferences.  His utility for the different possible 
outcomes might be as follows: if he loses an amount up to $160,000, dollars may correlate with 
utils; if he loses between $160,000 and $250,000, each marginal dollar may be worth two utils; if 
he loses more than $250,000, each dollar may be worth three utils.  These preferences are 
captured by the following graph:
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This description permits a more precise analysis of Dwayne’s options.  At trial, without 
an expert analysis, he has an 80 % chance of winning.  He expects to pay $25,000 to complete 
the trial.  If he wins, he will have expended $25,000, but he will owe Penelope nothing.  By 
hypothesis, this correlates to negative 25,000 utils.  If he loses, he will be liable for $400,000, 
plus he will have paid litigation costs of $25,000, for a net loss of $425,000.  This would 
correlate to a loss of one util per dollar for the first $160,000, two utils per dollar between 
$160,000 and $250,000, and three utils per dollar over $250,000, or 1 x 160,000 + 2 x 90,000 + 3 
x 175,000 = - 865,000 utils.  The value in utils of these odds and outcomes is .80 x -25,000 + .20 
x -865,000 = - 193,000 utils.
In contrast, if Dwayne pays for the expert analysis, he has an 85% chance of winning.  If 
he wins, the litigation will cost him $50,000 leaving him with a loss of negative 50,000 utils.  If 
he loses, he will pay $400,000, plus $50,000, for a total of $450,000.  The loss will be 1 x 
160,000 + 2 x 90,000 + 3 x 200,000 = - 940,000 utils.  These possibilities yield him utils of .85 x 
-50,000 + .15 x -940,000 = -183,500 utils.  
Dwayne will expect to lose 193,000 utils without the expert’s analysis and 183,500 utils 
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with the analysis.  Dwayne will pay for the analysis, even though it costs more than it is worth in 
terms of its average return in dollars. 
The result is different in EVA.  Without the analysis, Dwayne expects to pay $25,000 in 
litigation.  He anticipates that the arbitrator will award approximately $80,000, based on a twenty 
percent chance that Penelope will win and an expected award of $400,000.  His expected loss is 
$105,000.  This is a loss of 105,000 utils.  With the analysis, Dwayne expects to pay $50,000 in 
litigation.  He expects the arbitrator to award approximately $60,000, based on a fifteen percent 
chance that Penelope will win an award of $400,000.  His expected loss is $110,000, or 110,000 
utils.  He will prefer not to pay for the report.  (Note also that Dwayne fares better in EVA than 
at trial whether he pays for the expert report or not—as measured in the example, in EVA he will 
lose, respectively, 110,000 or 105,000 utils rather than 183,500 or 193,00 utils.)
The key point about Dwayne’s preferences is that they vary over a range, where dollars 
become of marginally greater value to Dwayne the more he loses.  EVA converts litigation that 
would produce discontinuous and polar results into litigation that will produce continuous 
results, so that marginal changes in expected value, and therefore outcome, are of the same value 
in utils as marginal investments in litigation.  A finder of fact at trial, as in the example of 
Penelope and Dwayne, may have to decide an issue that permits only one of two outcomes: the 
plaintiff will recover nothing or a large sum.  Additional expenditures in traditional litigation 
may have incremental effects on the likelihood of a recovery, but the outcome will remain 
binary.  
In contrast, incremental changes in the odds  of a plaintiff winning in court correlate to 
incremental changes in the amount of the award to the plaintiff in EVA.  A discontinuous 
function that describes the possible outcomes at trial becomes a continuous function that 
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describes the possible outcomes in EVA.  Each marginal dollar gained or lost falls in the same 
range of a party’s utility curve as dollars spent on litigation.  As a result, risk averse parties will 
not make investments in EVA that yield a net loss on average in dollars and that they would 
make in trial. Thus, the transformation from discontinuous to continuous results will in some 
circumstances reduce the costs of litigation.184
ii. In Trial, as Opposed to EVA, Risk Averse Parties Will at Times Fail to Make 
Investments in Litigation that on Average Would Produce a Net Gain in Dollars.
In trial, as opposed to EVA, risk averse parties at times will fail to make investments in 
litigation that on average would produce a net gain in dollars.  The reason is that they may most 
wish to avoid compounding the worst possible result at trial by incurring additional costs.  By 
eliminating this risk, EVA will encourage parties to make these investments.
Parties will at times have to decide whether to make expenditures that will exacerbate the 
worst possible result at trial, but that may increase the likelihood that they will win.  At times, 
risk averse parties will prefer not to take this chance.  Plaintiffs or defendants may forego 
expenditures on litigation that would on average yield a net gain in dollars, and plaintiffs may 
choose not to sue even if on average they would benefit by doing so.  An apt analogy is poker.  
These risk averse parties are like players who will bet only when they are all but certain to win a 
hand or, for some plaintiffs in these circumstances, like people who refuse to play poker at all.  
EVA, in contrast, removes the worst possible result of trial from the realm of 
possibilities.  An improvement in the strength of a party’s case will have an incremental effect on 
outcome at trial, just as will litigation costs.  One will be traded against the other.  Given that 
expenditures and improved prospects at trial have the same kind of marginal effect on the 
184
 A proof that risk-averse parties will invest in litigation in EVA if and only if doing so yields a net benefit on 
average in dollars is in Appendix IV.  It makes some plausible simplifying assumptions.
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ultimate result, parties will make expenditures that they expect to produce a net gain in dollars.
a.  An Example of a Party Making an Investment in EVA that it Would Not Risk Making at 
Trial.
Again, the hypothetical involving Penelope and Dwayne is useful.  Imagine that Penelope 
has a twenty percent chance of recovering $400,000 from Dwayne if she does not hire an expert 
witness to explain how the car accident may have caused her loss of balance.  On the other hand, 
she has a twenty-five percent chance of recovering $400,000 if she does hire the expert.  Assume 
that the expert would cost $10,000, in addition to the $40,000 she will otherwise spend on 
litigation.  Without the expert, the expected value of trial is ($400,000 x .20) - $40,000 = 
$40,000.
The $10,000 investment on average is worthwhile.  It would increase her average return 
from .20 x. $400,000 to .25 x $400,000, or from $80,000 to $100,000.  Her net expected gain is 
$100,000 - $80,000 = $20,000, which is larger than the cost of $10,000.
Penelope, however, may be in a financially difficult position.  Perhaps she can just make 
her car payments, pay her rent and put food on the table.  Any loss would force her to relinquish 
her car, which she needs for work.  Assuming she cannot find a contingency fee lawyer to take 
her case, she probably cannot afford to sue.185  If she does have just enough money to litigate, 
she may well not be able to afford an expert witness.  She may simply lack the capital to make an 
investment in litigation, even if it is likely to be profitable on average.186
Under these circumstances, EVA may improve her ability to invest in litigation.  She may 
be confident that the expected value of the case is large enough to pay her costs and attorney’s 
185
 This possibility is quite real.  Lewis Maltby reports, for example, that a survey of plaintiffs’ attorneys conducted 
in 1995 revealed that they would not take a case on behalf of an employee with less than $60,000 in provable 
damages, exclusive of pain and suffering and punitive damages.  See Lewis Maltby, Private Justice:  Employment 
Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29 n. 87 (1998).
186 Note, Settling for Less:  Applying Law and Economics to Poor People, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 442, 449 (1993).
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fees, even if she would stand some chance of losing at trial.  EVA would then allow her to bring 
an action which she otherwise could not bring or to expend an amount in support of her case that 
she otherwise could not afford to invest.  
b.  Utility Curves and a More Formal Analysis.
Again, a utility curve allows a more formal statement of this proposition.  Assume that  
for Penelope each dollar of loss greater than $30,000 is worth four utils, each dollar of loss up to 
$30,000 is worth two utils, and each dollar of gain is worth one util.   
If Penelope expects to go to trial, she will not pay for the expert.  With the expert she has 
a 25% chance of winning $350,000 ($400,000 less her costs of $50,000) and a 75% chance of 
losing her costs of $50,000.  Converting these odds and outcomes into utils:  .25 x 350,000 utils -
.75 x (30,000 x 2 + 20,000 x 4) = 87,500 – 105,000 = -17,500 utils.  Without the expert she has a 
20% chance of winning $360,000 and an 80% chance of losing $40,000.  This equates to:  .20 x 
360,000 utils – .80 x (30,000 x 2 + 10,000 x 4) = 72,000 – 80,000 = -8,000 utils.  She does better 
not to invest in the expert.
Moreover, note that she should not initiate litigation at all if she expects to go to trial.  
After all, even without the expert report she loses 8,000 utils.  This is worse than if she did not 
sue, which would leave her at 0 utils.  In other words, she would decline to invest in litigation 
that would yield a net gain on average in dollars.187
In contrast, Penelope will pay for the expert in EVA.  She also will have incentive to 
protect her legal rights through litigation.  Her recovery in EVA without the expert will be .20 x 
$400,000, or $80,000, less her costs of $40,000, or $40,000.  This is equal to 40,000 utils.  With 
187
 I recognize that she might bring a lawsuit in the hope that Dwayne will settle.  See David Rosenberg & Steven 
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for their Nuisance Value, 5 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 3 (1985); Robert G. 
Bone, Civil Procedure:  The Economics of Civil Procedure 45-50 (2003).  Still, all else being equal, she is less likely 
to sue where trial would be a losing proposition than where it would be a winning proposition.  In any case, this 
layer of strategic complexity is beyond the scope of this Article.
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the expert her recovery will be .25 x $400,000, or $100,000, less her costs of $50,000, or 
$50,000.  This is equal to 50,000 utils.  In other words, even after paying for the expert, she will 
do better by $10,000, or 10,000 utils.  In addition, with or without the expert litigation is 
worthwhile.
To be sure, the possible recoveries in a case, their odds of occurring, the costs of 
litigating, and their effect on the outcome of litigation can take various forms.  That Penelope 
will make different choices in the hypothetical situation is an artifact in part of the values I have 
assigned to each of these considerations.  At times, risk averse plaintiffs will make the same 
expenditures in EVA and trial.  The point, however, is that in EVA, as opposed to trial, risk 
averse parties generally have incentive to make any investments that would yield a net benefit on 
average in dollars.188  It is also worth noting that risk averse plaintiffs would not be expected to 
make investments that would produce a net loss.  They have no desire to take unprofitable risks 
just for the sake of gambling.
iii. Summary of the Effect of EVA on Expenditures in Litigation
In general, then, EVA should encourage risk averse litigants to make any expenditures, 
and only those expenditures, that will on average produce a net benefit in dollars.  This will 
mean that EVA should enable some parties to avoid litigation costs that yield a net loss on 
average in dollars and that they would incur in preparing for trial.  Conversely, EVA should 
enable other parties to make expenditures that yield a net gain on average in dollars and that they 
would not make if their only option was to litigate to a winner-take-all result.189
188
 This follows, with some simplifying assumptions, from the proof in Appendix IV.
189
 Admittedly, the analysis will at times be more complex than this argument suggests.  For example, outcomes in 
litigation often are not binary.  Moreover, the preferences of litigants may not conform to the models of a utility 
curves suggested above, if indeed they are consistent with any utility curves at all.  Examples abound of preferences 
different than those we have assumed for Penelope and Dwayne.  One likely possibility is a plaintiff who retains an 
attorney on a contingency basis.  The attorney may be willing to pay the costs of litigation and to seek 
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iv. EVA May Promote Efficient Expenditures in Litigation.  
EVA may promote efficient investment in litigation.  This should be true if one accepts 
two premises:  first, that the substantive laws and procedural rules are designed to be efficient; 
and, second, that courts generally craft rules to promote efficiency relying on the simplifying 
assumption that parties are risk neutral.  
The idea that the substantive laws and the rules governing litigation tend to be efficient is 
not novel.  Economists have long argued that these rules tend to approximate efficiency, if only 
under the guidance of something akin to Adam Smith’s invisible hand.190  This does not mean 
law and economics has no room to criticize existing doctrine or to suggest reforms.  It is just that 
the law on the whole can be explained reasonably well as promoting efficiency.191
At the same time, the bulk of economic analysis—descriptive and prescriptive—tends to 
assume that litigants are indifferent to risk.  To be sure, economists recognize that parties tend to 
be averse to risk.192  However, as a practical matter, preferences about risk are too variable and 
too complicated for economists to take them into account routinely.  Aversion to risk often 
confounds general predictions about how people will behave.  As a result, most economic 
reimbursement for those costs and recovery of attorneys’ fees only if the plaintiff wins.  Under such circumstances, 
a different set of incentives in litigation may result.  Of course, the incentives may not be that different.  The concern 
about risk may just shift from the client to the attorney, who may bring about decisions that are similar to the ones 
the plaintiff would make if her own money were at risk. Similarly, Dwayne may be insured, as most motorists are.  
The insurance company would likely be far less concerned than an individual about a loss of several hundreds of 
thousands of dollars at trial for any one case.  
Still, the analysis in the text should be typical for those risk-averse litigants for whom EVA is an attractive 
choice.  
190
 See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norms in Common Law Adjudication, 
8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487, 488 (1980); John C. Goodman, An Economic theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. 
Legal Stud. 393, 394-95 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 
J. Legal Stud. 65, 65-66 (1977).  
191
 See Frank I. Michelman, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 308 (1979) 
(acknowledging that the law, taken as a whole, appears as it would if judges sought to maximize social wealth).
192 See, e.g., Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, § 1.2, at 12.
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arguments, in practice if not in theory, assume risk neutrality.  With this assumption in place, 
economists seek to create incentives so that parties promoting their own economic self-interest 
will act to maximize wealth in society as a whole.  
Within this framework, the incentives EVA creates to invest in litigation look quite good 
when compared to those in trial.  The rules governing litigation, it is assumed, generally 
encourage parties to make efficient investments.  Aversion to—or a taste for—risk will distort 
these incentives.  EVA serves as a corrective to that distortion.  It diminishes the role that risk 
plays in litigation.  As a result, parties are more likely to respond as if they are indifferent to risk.  
They will not to make investments in litigation that produce a net loss on average in dollars.  
They will invest if doing so produces a net gain net gain on average in dollars.  The parties’
behavior will approximate risk neutrality, the kind of behavior that courts (and economists)
usually assume when it comes to crafting rules.193
b. EVA May Enable Vulnerable Parties to Invest in Litigation to Protect their Legal Rights.
EVA may be of particular assistance to vulnerable members of society, who will be able
to invest in EVA as if they were risk neutral.  As noted, vulnerable members of society tend to be 
particularly averse to risk.194 They are likely to be motivated by this risk aversion to forego 
investments in litigation that would benefit them on average in dollars or to make investments 
that will yield a net loss on average in dollars.  EVA should correct these tendencies.  
193
 This is true, for example, of the theory of efficient breach of contract.  Efficiency can explain the rule that a 
breaching party should restore the non-breaching party to the same position she would have occupied but for the 
breach.  Doing so will deter breaches that will not add to social wealth.  See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Law, at § 4.8, 119.  This simple explanation, however, fails to take into account risk-aversion (or, for that matter, the 
cost of resolving a dispute).  If one does consider risk aversion, the analysis would become much more complicated.  
It is not at all clear that giving a party an efficient remedy at the end of trial if the party wins will translate into 
efficient conduct.  The same is true with the rule that plaintiffs are to receive compensatory damages in tort.  Id. at § 
6.10, 191-92.  Indeed, economists often assume that incremental steps toward efficiency will help to promote 
efficiency, even though this may not be true in our highly inefficient world.  For an overview of a theory that 
questions this way of proceeding—the so-called “Theory of Second Best”—see John J. Donohue III, Some 
Thoughts on Law and Economics and the General Theory of Second Best, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 257 (1998).
194 Note, Settling for Less:  Applying Law and Economics to Poor People, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 442, 444 (1993).
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Moreover, for similar reasons, EVA may improve the prospects for vulnerable parties in 
settlement.  Vulnerable parties negotiating in the shadow of trial will be hindered by the prospect 
of an investment strategy that would not pay off on average in dollars.  For example, a plaintiff 
might feel compelled to accept a low settlement in recognition of her inability to fund litigation,
or a defendant might pay substantial damages in part based on the expenditures that he would 
feel unable to resist, even though they would not make sense in average dollars.  By encouraging
vulnerable parties to make those investments and only those investments that pay off on average 
in dollars, EVA should help vulnerable litigants to insist on settlement terms that more closely 
reflect the average outcome at trial than if they were litigating to a winner-take-all result.195
IV. Assessing EVA from Various Theoretical Perspectives.
Three qualities of EVA have been the focus of the analysis thus far:  it allows litigants to 
insist on their legal rights without the risk of trial; it tends to produce relatively small errors, 
whether measured as expected error costs or as the size of errors in particular cases; and it 
encourages risk averse litigants to make those investments and only those investments in 
litigation that will yield a net gain on average in dollars.  The next issue is whether in light of 
these characteristics EVA should be made available as an option to disputants.  Three 
perspectives are of particular use in addressing this issue:  law and economics, rights theory, and 
a public-life conception of trial.196  Part IV argues that parties should be permitted to choose 
EVA no matter which of these perspectives one adopts.
195
 As noted above, powerful litigants may resist EVA for this reason, but they may not.  See supra Part III.A.iii.b.
196 A fourth possible perspective is libertarianism.  Libertarianism champions informed choice as an end in itself.  It 
holds that people should be allowed to make decisions for themselves to the greatest extent possible.  See, e.g., 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 57-87 (1974).  Making EVA available to disputants finds strong support 
in libertarianism, for EVA should both expand and clarify disputants’ options.  Because no party would be forced to 
participate in EVA against its will, allowing parties to choose EVA does not appear to infringe on anyone’s rights.
Still, this argument is not particular to EVA.  It holds true for any alternative to trial.  For that reason, it does not 
warrant extended discussion.
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A. Law and Economics.
Perhaps the most sympathetic view of EVA should come from economists.  They 
generally seek to structure the law to encourage efficient behavior.  For present purposes, it is 
useful to define behavior as efficient if it distributes goods and services to the person who would 
be willing to pay the most for them or, to use an equivalent formulation, if it allocates them in 
the same was as would a market with no barriers to transactions.197
i.  Deferring to the Choice of the Parties.
One would expect the initial reaction of economists to be to endorse EVA.  After all,
parties will engage in EVA only if they choose to do so.  This should mean that for disputants, 
EVA is wealth-maximizing.  Economists generally defer to the private choice of parties.198
Economist may nevertheless have some qualms about EVA.  In particular, a concern 
would be that making EVA available as a choice may have undesirable effects on the incentives 
it creates for a party deciding whether to take action that may violate someone’s legal rights.  
But, as Professor Hylton has pointed out in a related context, the parties should take into account 
the benefit of the incentives created by legal rights in deciding whether to agree to alternatives to 
trial. 199  That decision will reflect the cost of avoiding a rights violation, the harm from failing to 
197
 See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at § 1.2, 12-16.  I mean here to adopt the Kaldor-Hicks 
conception of efficiency, as does Posner and, he claims, as do most economists in practice.  Id. at 14.
198
 Economists are apt to treat dispute resolution as a private good.  See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235 (1979).  For a criticism of this approach see, e.g., Paul 
D. Carrington, Adjudication as a Private Good:  A Comment, 8 J. Legal Stud. 303 (1979).  Indeed, if private choices 
of parties were generally viewed as undesirable because they distort the incentives created by the legal system, 
settlement should be viewed as undesirable as well.  However, the opposite is true.  Economists generally approve of 
settlement.  They should therefore approve of EVA as well, if parties prefer it to trial.
199
 See generally Keith Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:  An Economic Analysis, 8 S. Ct. 
Econ. Rev. 209 (2000).  Professor Hylton addresses the issue initially in the context of waiver of legal rights, but his 
analysis extends to alternatives to trial, as he notes.  See id. at 213.
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do so, and the cost of the competing dispute resolution options.200  As a result, the parties should 
enter into EVA only if, all things considered, it is the best choice for them.201
Economist may also focus on externalities in raising concerns about EVA.  In particular, 
they may worry about the effect of the incentives EVA would create on the rights of third parties.  
There are two responses to this concern.  First, as Professor Hylton contends, the choice of some 
litigants (or prospective litigants) to enter into EVA should not affect third parties adversely.  
Third parties can pursue their own claims if their legal rights are violated and can choose their 
own preferred method of dispute resolution.202
Second, even if one does not accept Professor Hylton’s argument regarding 
externalities—perhaps because not all harms give rise to legal rights—EVA would seem as 
likely to be efficient as trial.  Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the law is efficient, EVA 
should not compromise that efficiency.  After all, EVA does not change the average liability of 
defendants or the average recovery of plaintiffs.  Those remain the same, as long as they are 
measured in average dollars.  In this sense, EVA leaves the prevailing legal standard intact.  As a 
result, when measured in expected dollars, EVA should not change the incentives the law 
creates.
One might argue in response to this last point that EVA eliminates risk and, thereby, does 
to some extent change incentives.  This change could lead to inefficiencies.  But this contention 
assumes a precision to economic analysis that probably does not exist in the real world.  
Economists, and courts to the extent they adopt economic analysis, infrequently take into 
account risk aversion in analyzing efficiency.  They tend to work in average dollars.  As a result, 
200
 Id. at 218-22.  
201
 This conclusion follows naturally from the Coase Theorem, as Professor Hylton points out.  Id. at 222.
202
 Id. at 238-39.
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EVA’s tendency to decrease risk is just as likely to improve the efficiency of incentives as it is to 
render the legal system less efficient.203
ii.   Minimizing Errors
Another reason that economists should approve of EVA is that it tends to minimize 
errors.  As discussed above, unlike proportionate damages, it produces the same expected error 
costs as trial.  Moreover, like proportionate damages, EVA avoids the largest errors in particular 
cases.  These characteristics of EVA should mean that actors will anticipate relatively small 
errors in EVA.  Economists generally approve accuracy in adjudication and believe that accurate 
results should promote efficiency.204  EVA fares well by this criterion.
In this regard, it is important to note that some scholars have pointed out that accuracy in
adjudication is not always measured most effectively by the average size of errors or the size of 
errors in particular cases.  Professor Levmore has made a strong argument, for example, that the 
preponderance-of-evidence standard will not minimize expected error costs in cases involving 
recurring wrongs and that in these circumstances it may be better at times to award proportionate 
damages.205  EVA produces the same expected error costs as trial, so it, too, will not perform as 
well as proportionate damages in these circumstances.
Two responses seem appropriate.  A first, minor point is that recurring wrongs may be 
the exception, which can explain in part why proportionate damages are not common in our legal 
203
 Indeed, as I have noted, EVA may better promote efficiency, to the extent it encourages parties to act as if they 
are risk-neutral.
204
 This is one of the premises of Posner’s analysis of efficient rules of civil procedure and evidence.  See Richard 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, § 21.2, at 549-50 (analyzing efficient rules of civil procedure); Richard Posner, 
An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477, 1480-87 (1999) (analyzing efficient rules of 
evidence).
205
 See Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, 19 J. Legal Stud. 691, 697-98 (1990).  Levmore use the term the 
“probabilistic rule” for what I have labeled proportionate damages.  See id. at 697.  Also, his proposal is not limited 
to proportionate damages.  He suggests a hybrid of three approaches, depending on the confidence of the finder of 
fact in the proper result of a case, that at times would use a winner-take-all approach, at times would award 
proportionate damages, and at times would award a form of restitution.  Id. at 721-25.  This greater level of subtlety 
does not affect the point in the text.
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system. If so, Levmore’s criticism of the preponderance-of-evidence rule is valuable, but only in 
limited circumstances, as he recognizes.
The second, more important point is that EVA and proportionate damages are not 
mutually exclusive.  If courts would do better at times to award proportionate damages, and if 
they are able to identify the cases in which that is true, they may do well to adopt Professor 
Levmore’s proposal.206 His approach would then become part of the calculation in EVA.  The 
arbitrator would make a prediction about the average award in court, taking into account the 
possibility that trial would result in proportionate damages.  Nothing about this or any other legal 
standard is incompatible with EVA.
iii.  Encouraging Efficient Expenditures in Litigaiton.
A third reason economists may find EVA attractive is because of the incentives it creates 
for investment in litigation.  Evaluating this claim is tricky because economists have had 
difficulty coming up with a compelling standard for when litigation costs are efficient. They 
have at times addressed this issue, most notably in the context of discovery and the rules of 
evidence.207 But no consensus has emerged.208
One plausible model for efficient investment in litigation is presented by Richard 
Posner.209  He sets it forth in the context of assessing the rules of evidence.  His analysis can be 
extended to questions of law, depending on one’s philosophical view.210  According to Posner, 
two competing values are at stake in gathering evidence (and, I would add, in presenting it to the 
206
 See id. at 721-25.
207 See, e.g, Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. Legal Stud. 
435 (1994); Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery:  Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. Legal Stud. 481 (1994).
208
 As Robert Bone notes, one difficulty is that there is no ready measure of the social benefits from accuracy in 
litigation.  See Robert G. Bone, Civil Procedure:  An Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure 218 (2003).
209
 Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1477 (1999).  Actually, he 
discusses two equivalent models.
210
 Acceptance of this view may be implicit in Posner’s discussion of the impact of cases as precedent in addressing 
the social value of adjudicative accuracy.
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court).  First, there are the costs of gathering evidence.  These may be borne by one or both 
parties, by the court in resolving discovery disputes, or by third parties or society at large.211
Second, there is the benefit of accuracy at trial.  Additional evidence can enhance the prospects 
that the court will decide a case accurately, but, generally, with a trade-off in higher costs. 
Balancing these costs and benefits, Posner’s plausible view is that an investment in 
litigation is efficient if it costs less than its predicted improvement in accuracy at trial.212  An 
improvement in accuracy, in turn, is measured by the product of the increased odds that the court 
will decide a case properly and the stakes in the litigation.213
One could argue based on this model that EVA creates more efficient incentives to invest 
in litigation than trial.  After all, EVA should tend to encourage investments in litigation if and 
only if they will result in a net improvement to a party’s position.  In other words, the amount of 
the investment must be less than the change in accuracy in the predicted outcome multiplied by 
the stakes.
Some problems arise with this justification for EVA (some of which apply more 
generally to Posner’s model).  First, a party in deciding whether to invest to enhance its prospects 
in litigation has little incentive to consider the costs and benefits to others of trial.  The party may 
ignore the costs it imposes on other participants in litigation, including the opposing party (who 
may have to respond, for example, to a discovery request), the court (which may have to resolve 
a discovery dispute), or third parties (which may have to respond to a subpoena).  Indeed, a party 
may use potential harms from discovery strategically to extract a settlement on favorable terms 
211
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from an adversary.214  Alternatively, the party may fail to conduct discovery that it perceives as 
too costly, even if it would benefit others, perhaps by improving the likelihood of a correct 
decision that will serve as precedent.  Second, a party’s prospects may improve by misleading 
the court, not just by enlightening the court.  Additional evidence may lead the court astray; one 
cannot assume it will always enhance the accuracy of the court’s decision.215  Third, the parties’ 
competing investments may cancel out and yet they may not be able to cooperate sufficiently to 
refrain from making those investments.216  Fourth, the benefit to society from the accurate 
resolution of a case may not in fact correlate to the stakes to the parties.  As Posner notes, for 
example, high-stakes litigation may depend in part on interpretation of a law that has 
subsequently been revised.217  The value of accurate interpretation of the law will not necessarily 
correspond to the amount that is in controversy.
The difficulties of arriving at a compelling standard for efficient investment in litigation 
may support a relatively modest claim in favor of EVA:  it encourages litigants to make those 
investments and only those investments in litigation that will yield a net gain to a party on 
average in dollars.  Approving of this effect is not inconsistent with adopting some other 
standard, like Posner’s, as a guide to formulating the rules of evidence or procedure.  It simply 
adds another, useful criterion:  all else being equal, a standard for dispute resolution is efficient if 
214
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it encourages litigatants to invest in litigation as if they were risk-neutral.  That is what EVA 
does.
This conclusion follows, as discussed above, from assuming that the substantive and 
procedural rules are likely to be efficient, but only under the simplifying assumption that litigants 
are risk-neutral.218 EVA simply helps to get litigants to conform to this model of behavior.  EVA 
thereby should promote efficiency.  
iv.  Reducing the Costs to the Public of Dispute Resolution.
A final consideration in assessing EVA from an economic perspective is the effect it
would have on the public cost of administering litigation.  This issue tends to be of particular 
importance to economists.  They see one of the main harms of litigation as the costs that it entails 
and are particularly concerned that litigants lack incentive to take into account the costs they 
impose on others.219  The salaries of judges and courtroom staff, the time of jurors who are 
conscripted to service, the maintenance of buildings that house trials—these are all externalities 
that litigants have little reason to consider in deciding how to resolve their disputes.220
Much like other alternatives to trial, EVA should ease the burden on the public of 
resolving disputes.  This is another of its potential benefits, although it is not special to EVA.  
All forms of alternative dispute resolution that lure disputants away from trial should on the 
whole ease the burden on the state and federal judiciaries.  In EVA, as with other private means 
218
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of dispute resolution, the parties pay for the dispute resolution process, which otherwise would 
be borne by the public.221
In sum, for various reasons, economists should conclude that making EVA available as 
an option would promote efficiency.
B. Rights Theorists
A second view from which to asses EVA is that of rights theorists.  By rights theorists I 
mean those who view legal rights as being intrinsically worthy of respect.  A common 
justification for this view is that the law has a “moral authority.”222 Professor Ronald Dworkin 
has developed perhaps the most complete argument of any contemporary scholar as to why the 
law should be read has having a moral force that warrants our allegiance.223
Rights theorists should find much about EVA that is attractive.  As discussed above, 
EVA honors the prevailing legal regime in way that other forms of imposed compromise do not.  
Moreover, also as discussed above, EVA should empower the most vulnerable members of 
221
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222
 I borrow the phrase from David Luban, Lawyers and Justice:  An Ethical Study 31-49 (1988)
223
 See generally Law’s Empire, esp. 2111-13  (1986).
83
society by allowing them to pursue their legal rights without facing the risks of trial and by 
enabling them to invest in litigation as if they were risk-neutral.224
Rights theorists, however, might be less favorably impressed than economists with the 
approach EVA takes to errors in adjudication. After all, it could be argued that EVA abandons
the effort to decide cases exactly correctly.225  A right theorist might criticize EVA because 
parties’ rights should be vindicated and that means decision-makers should try to get a case 
precisely right.
But this view is unsatisfying.  Although adjudicatory errors are undesirable, they are also 
inevitable.  And trying to get a case precisely right comes at a cost.  In particular, a winner-take-
all approach does not mean that the decision-maker will err by less on average than would EVA.  
To the contrary, if EVA is done properly, it will produce the same errors on average as trial and, 
in any given case, any error it produces will tend to be relatively small.  
Moreover, EVA is highly respectful of legal rights, once one acknowledges that litigation 
necessarily entails uncertainty.  The compromises it produces are in a sense pure.  As I have 
argued, they reflect only the law and the evidence, as they would be interpreted by potential 
decision-makers.  The only difference between trial and EVA in this regard is that trial reflects a 
single decision-maker’s assessment of the parties’ legal rights while EVA reflects a blend of how 
an expert believes different decision-makers might resolve a dispute.  None of this is to deny that 
a rights theorist might place some value on the potential trial holds to give full vindication to the 
legal rights of an aggrieved party.  It is just to recognize that we cannot count on trial to be 
accurate in assessing the parties’ legal rights.
224
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EVA, then, has both strengths and weaknesses.  On one hand, EVA honors rights in a 
way that other forms of imposed compromise do not.  Further, EVA may help the most 
vulnerable members of society to pursue their legal rights.  Even when it comes to errors in 
adjudication, EVA will produce the same errors on average as trial and avoid the largest errors 
that trial may produce.  Once one accepts that errors are inevitable, this is a pretty attractive 
combination of characteristics.  
On the other hand, EVA does not hold the potential for unqualified vindication of a 
party’s legal rights.  Some parties may value this highly, particularly where litigation is not so 
much about the practical relief it may yield as about declaring who is right and who is wrong.  
Although I would argue that the balance tips in favor of EVA, there may be no clearly  preferable 
method for resolving disputes in light of these competing considerations.  
Nevertheless, one firm conclusion may be possible:  the choice should be left to the 
parties.  After all, if the concern in civil litigation is to protect the legal rights of the individual to 
seek redress, in our system that right is alienable.  This makes sense of the clearly established 
rule that a party may choose not to seek legal vindication through a civil case at all.  She also 
may cede her right to sue for money or trade it for some other from of compensation. 
Indeed, this holds true even when the underlying right a party possesses is not itself 
alienable.  In this regard, it is important to distinguish between those rights that the substantive 
law protects and the right to seek redress in court.  Some substantive rights may not be 
permissible objects of exchange.  It may be that a person cannot give them away or can do so 
only under limited circumstances.  So, for example, neither suicide nor consent to euthanasia is 
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generally legal.226  The right to live is often not alienable.  A person cannot accept a payment and 
in return agree to be the target of a killing.  But a person who has been the victim of attempted 
murder may settle any civil claims to which the attack gives rise, choosing financial 
compensation, an admission of guilt, an apology, or some other form of compensation for an 
agreement not to pursue litigation.  The underlying right, in other words, is not alienable, but the 
right to seek redress in civil litigation is alienable.  
If the right to seek redress in court is individual and if it is alienable, EVA should be 
permissible.  Perhaps for a court to impose compromise against an aggrieved person’s will 
would violate that person’s right to legal redress.  The aggrieved person may have a right to 
insist on taking a chance on full vindication, which EVA will not generally provide.  This is a 
potential argument against imposing a compromise in court.  However, we generally permit 
disputants to settle their civil claims on whatever terms they want and we do not require them to 
prosecute their civil claims at all.  Given this deference to individual choice, making EVA 
available as an option should be consistent with the individual right to vindication in court.
226
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C. The Public-Life Conception of Trial
The perspective most likely to provide a basis for rejecting EVA is one that focuses on 
the message that court decisions communicate to society.  This message can take many forms.  It 
may be as pragmatic as providing precedent that clarifies how courts are likely to resolve 
particular cases in the future.227  It may be as lofty as expressing the values that the law 
instantiates and thereby inculcating them in citizens.228  EVA would deprive society of these 
benefits.  
From this perspective, looking at the size of errors in particular cases does not capture the 
gains and losses associated with EVA.  As a private form of dispute resolution, EVA does not 
permit the government to use resolution of a disagreement as a means of communication.  EVA 
does not entail a public proclamation of who was right and who was wrong, nor will resolution 
of a legal issue in EVA be binding on future litigants.
Indeed, even if a court, as opposed to an arbitrator, were to impose a compromised 
outcome, the gains and losses might not be reflected fully by an assessment of the size of errors.  
Communicating a legal rule, or the values that a rule embodies, probably cannot be achieved in 
half-measures.  A result that balances possible legal rules could leave the law ill-defined and, 
indeed, may contribute to its ambiguity.  Even if a court were to make a determination of the 
law, and to compromise based only on its doubts about the facts, the message it communicated 
might be garbled.  At the least, a new standard would have to be developed to distinguish 
holdings from dicta, potentially confusing the import of a court’s ruling on the law.  And the 
failure of a court to take a clear stand on what did and did not occur in a case might undermine 
227
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confidence in the court’s judgment in a particular case,229 perhaps even in the legal system as a 
whole.230
These concerns about the message litigation communicates have some force in court.  
That the parties want a court to impose a compromise may not be a sufficient justification for it 
to do so.  After all, parties do not have unfettered power to formulate the standard a court will 
use to resolve their disputes .  They can choose to settle.  But if they ask a court to impose a 
result, there are limitations on the willingness of courts to apply the law as the parties wish.231
Giving up this control may be a fair exchange for the burden that the parties are imposing on the 
legal system.
Two reasons nevertheless support allowing parties to choose EVA.  First, our system 
does not generally conscript parties into participating in civil litigation so as to send a message to 
society.  Generally, if the parties to litigation agree on the terms of settlement, they may deprive 
society of the benefits that trial (and appeal) would provide.232  Consistent with this general 
approach, parties should be allowed to choose EVA.  Second, to the extent that EVA would 
benefit vulnerable members of society, we should hesitate to foreclose it as an option.  The least 
well-off in society should not be forced to bear the burden of providing our legal system with 
229
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precedent and declaring the values that our legal system honors.233  For these two reasons, if we 
want to encourage litigation, we should make it attractive as an option and not deter people from 
pursuing other means for resolving their disputes, including EVA.
V. Practical Concerns about EVA.
Finally, several additional practical concerns arise in analyzing EVA.  These include:  
whether EVA will be able to achieve predictability and reliability; whether biases will affect 
arbitrators in EVA; and which factors should be considered in assigning an expected value to a 
case.  Each warrants brief discussion.
A. Predictability and Reliability in EVA.
In time, EVA may progress beyond relying on the informed judgment of a seasoned 
lawyer or judge.  Empirical evidence may be amassed to support Expected Value Arbitration.  
Such evidence could lend accuracy and predictability to the awards imposed by expected value 
arbitrators.  Institutions dedicated to providing arbitration services will have incentive to collect 
data on the outcomes of litigation in various fields and to make that data available to disputants 
contemplating Expected Value Arbitration.  Litigants entering Expected Value Arbitration with 
such service providers would thus retain their right to argue their case before a neutral party, 
while gaining confidence about the likely outcome of adjudication and without fear of an
aberrantly unfavorable result.
Indeed, use of empirical evidence to assign expected value may be the next natural step in 
a progression that has already begun.  Consider the decision of Judge Weinstein in Geressy v. 
233 For a similar point in regard to the allocation of attorney’s fees see Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Trial and Settlement:  Allocating Attorney’s Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 
65, 138 (1996).
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Digital Equipment Corporation.234  New York law required the federal court in a diversity action 
to assess whether the amount of the jury award “deviate[d] materially from what would be 
reasonable compensation.”235  In undertaking this effort, Judge Weinstein focused in particular
on a large award for pain and suffering.  He used as a guide a statistical analysis of awards in 
past cases.  First, he grouped together similar cases.  Second, he assessed the statistical variation 
within the group.  Third, he defined in statistical terms the materiality of the deviation.  
A similar sort of analysis could add rigor and predictability to EVA.  Providers of dispute 
resolution services could identify the characteristics of disputes that appear to have the most 
significant influence on whether the plaintiff will win and the amount of any recovery.  This 
information could then be provided to litigants, who would know the considerations that will 
inform resolution of the dispute and the likely recovery of the plaintiff.  Of course, some crucial
information may have to await an assessment by the arbitrator.  The credibility of a key witness, 
for example, may figure prominently in assessing the probable result in a case, a determination 
which cannot be made authoritatively until the witness actually testifies.  In general, however, 
transparency about the methodology for calculating awards in EVA and the data on which the 
arbitrator will rely should clarify the choices available to litigants and allow them a greater 
ability to anticipate the outcome of EVA.
None of this is to say that EVA would at first be perfectly accurate or predictable.  Judge 
Weinstein himself recognized in Geressy the imprecision of his effort.236  He hoped for 
improvement as “[i]n time, a sophisticated literature and precedents may develop.”237  EVA at 
234
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first would be similarly imprecise.  With experience, however, Expected Value Arbitration might 
benefit from—and, indeed, contribute to—the development of a literature and data regarding 
court awards under various circumstances.  The result could well be a relatively predictable form 
of dispute resolution—indeed, one that may be more predictable than trial.
B.  Biases that May Affect Arbitrators.
Given the novelty of EVA, it is also important to consider how arbitrators might stray 
from the task assigned to them.  In particular, they may be influenced by various biases.   Two 
are likely.  The first is that the arbitrator will not be able to separate her view of the facts and the 
law from the views others might hold.  In other words, she may have a tendency to impose a 
winner-take-all approach rather than the average of predicted results.  A second possibility is that 
arbitrators will be apt to “split the difference” too often.  Rather than rule in a way that will 
reflect the chances of success of a litigant with a strong case, the arbitrator will choose an 
outcome that strikes a balance between the positions of each party.
Both of these tendencies seem possible.  A few general points should be made in 
response to them.  The first is that these tendencies may be off-setting.  An arbitrator’s
inclination to “split the difference” may run directly contrary to her view of how the case should 
be decided.  When both tendencies motivate a single arbitrator, they may cancel out.  Of course, 
this reasoning will not apply when the two biases skew the results in the same direction or when 
an arbitrator is motivated by one tendency to the exclusion of the other.
A second general point about possible bias is that any judgment on EVA should await its 
actual practice.  Only with experience will we be able to assess whether the outcomes vary from 
the averages at trial and, perhaps more important, whether litigants feel that they do and 
therefore that the process does not achieve its avowed goal.
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A third, related point is that arbitrators may become progressively more disciplined about 
imposing expected value outcomes over time.  This may be aided by an institution’s experience 
over time with using data to make determinations more reliable and predictable, as discussed in 
Part IV.A.  
Aside from these general responses, brief attention to each type of bias is appropriate.  
The first concern is that arbitrators will have a tendency to decide issues on the merits.  This may 
occur because of a conscious decision not to follow the rules of Expected Value Arbitration.  
More likely, an arbitrator will be unaware that she is overly optimistic that others will agree with 
her.  This would mean that expected value outcomes will approximate winner-take-all outcomes 
more than they should.  While this result will not honor the choice of the parties, it should not 
keep EVA from being a viable alternative to trial. Such a bias would merely make EVA a hybrid 
between the standard it is supposed to impose and trial.238  This hybrid may be attractive to some 
litigants, even if they would prefer a purer form of EVA.
The second concern is that arbitrators may avoid difficult decisions.  They may be 
tempted to cheat toward an inappropriate compromise.  But this problem extends beyond 
expected value arbitrators.  In fact, this temptation may be stronger in trial, given the harsh 
results it tends to produce, than in EVA, where the arbitrator is permitted to compromise based 
on uncertainty.  Given that trial suffers from this possibility in much the same way as EVA, it 
does not seem to be a reason to rule out EVA as an option for litigants who prefer it to trial.
238 Indeed, many suspect that this hybrid already exists in winner-take-all litigation, where decision-makers, 
including arbitrators and juries, may cheat toward an average result in difficult cases.  In regard to arbitrators, see, 
e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 Minn. L. 
Rev. 703, (1999) (discussing evidence that arbitrators often do not follow a strict interpretation of the law).  In 
regard to juries see, e.g., Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1601, 1612-18 (2001) (discussing 
evidence that juries nullify legal standard, including by reaching compromise verdicts that split the difference 
between either side prevailing).
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Indeed, in dispute resolution generally, perhaps the most effective check on both of the 
biases discussed above would be to have as many clearly defined options available to litigants as 
possible.  Decision-makers who feel that litigants have made an informed choice may be less 
reluctant to impose the requested standard rigorously.  For example, many lawyers believe that 
some decision-makers already “split the difference,” even though they are supposed to apply the 
law to the facts just as a court would do.239  This is troubling because litigants rarely know 
whether, for example, their arbitrator will choose to impose a compromised outcome and, if so, 
what the arbitrator will take into account in reaching a compromise.  Traditional arbitrators may 
be more rigorous in undertaking their assigned task, however, if they know litigants could have 
chosen EVA and declined to do so.  Making EVA available therefore would not only allow 
litigants to have a compromise imposed on them but, ironically, it might also increase the ability 
of litigants to pursue a winner-take-all result in arbitration, enhancing their autonomy whatever 
form of dispute resolution they choose. 240
C.  Factors in Assigning the Expected Value of Trial.
EVA depends in part on the law and the evidence.  Various other factors, however, affect 
the average result of trial, some of which the arbitrator should take into account and others the 
arbitrator perhaps should not.
Most troubling may be the proper response of the arbitrator if Penelope argues that the 
results of EVA should reflect her advantage if she has greater resources than Dwayne.  He may 
239
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be unable to afford to prepare as effectively for trial.  If so, Penelope might argue that the 
arbitrator should award more than the evidence and the law suggest.  
This argument has some force.  It is true that the relative resources of the parties are 
likely to skew the results of trial.  Otherwise, the substantial investments that parties make in 
litigation are difficult to explain.  Nevertheless, a couple of responses are available.
First, Dwayne may complain of double-counting.  Penelope’s greater resources are likely 
to affect the presentation to the arbitrator, and so to take into account the disparity in resources a 
second time may fail to predict accurately how a real court would be likely to rule.241
A second and more fundamental objection to Penelope’s argument is that disparities in 
resources should not affect the outcome of dispute resolution.  They do, but that is a necessary 
evil in our adversarial system.242  Courts are supposed to judge the merits of a lawsuit, not the 
parties before them.  A natural corollary to this is that the wealth of a party should not benefit it 
at trial.  As a result, courts should attempt to compensate for disparities in resources; they should 
not deliberately exacerbate them.243  For this reason, EVA – like trial – should be designed to 
minimize the effect that disparities in resources have on dispute resolution.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that Penelope would require Dwayne to agree that the 
arbitrator be instructed to award an amount that reflects her greater wealth.  Dwayne may 
nevertheless prefer EVA to trial.  And since the parties have control over the standard the 
arbitrator is to use, the arbitrator presumably would have to honor this decision.  However, 
sufficient protection for a vulnerable party may come from the opposing party’s lack of interest 
241 This objection, however, does not undermine Penelope’s argument completely.  Relative resources may have a 
more profound effect at trial than in Expected Value Arbitration, as I have argued above.  See infra Parts III.A and 
III.C.
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in defining EVA with this degree of precision.244  The default should be that disparities in 
resources will have whatever effect on the arbitration is inevitable based on the quality of each 
party’s presentation of its case and no more.
In any case, arbitrators over time should be able to address these and other 
considerations.245 About some of the relevant factors arbitrators will not doubt be explicit at the 
outset.  About others the parties may not require clarification.  Determining which considerations 
count in EVA should not pose an insurmountable obstacle to its adoption.
244
 Courts also may refuse to enforce agreements to enter EVA if they are framed in a way that is one-sided.  See, 
e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming in part refusal to enforce arbitration 
agreement under California law because of its “one-sidedness”).
245
 Similar issues arise around other possible factors affecting the outcome in EVA.  One that may have a large 
impact on the outcome at trial is the judge who is presiding.  If the parties know a particular judge is assigned to 
their case, they could well make arguments about how that judge is likely to rule.  This problem may not arise with 
great frequency.  Parties may generally agree to enter Expected Value Arbitration before either side files a lawsuit 
and the case is assigned to a judge.  Moreover, to the extent a judge has been assigned but judge shopping remains a 
possibility – for example, if one of the parties might file additional cases and then attempt to coordinate or 
consolidate the cases in a different court – the odds of the success of this strategy, too, might be taken into account.  
Nevertheless, in some instances the identity of the judge in a case may be known. 
Taking this factor into account in calculating the expected value of a case would run counter to the fiction 
that judges are neutral and merely apply the law to the facts before them.  Ours is supposed to be a system of the rule 
of law, not of men (or women).  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1187 
(1989).  But no experienced litigator believes this to be true.  Indeed, many litigators believe that the judge is one of 
the most important factors in one’s chances for success in litigation.  Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that so much 
depends on which judge is presiding.  Perhaps the best answer, much like with disparities in resources, is that in the 
interests of justice the expected value arbitrator should not predict the outcome before a particular judge, unless the 
parties so specify.
Another factor is the location of the litigation.  The judges in a jurisdiction may tend to share a view of the 
law, and juries from a particular locale may have common sympathies and biases.  Again, at the least, the possibility 
of successful forum-shopping by either party would have to be considered.  And if the litigation has yet to 
commence, the parties might fairly debate where it might legitimately be filed.  
Allowing the inclinations of judges and juries in a particular locale to inform the decision of the expected 
value arbitrator is somewhat less troubling than considering the propensities of a particular judge, if only because a 
greater cross-section of decision-makers is involved.  It also may lend greater precision in predicting what a court 
would be likely to do.  For these reasons, arbitrators should perhaps be somewhat less resistant to taking this factor 
into account, whether or not the parties provide explicit instructions.
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VI. Conclusion
In sum, EVA would have several attractive features.  First and foremost, it would allow 
parties to have an objective expert impose a fair compromise based on a prediction of what 
would happen in court.  This should be attractive to two, overlapping groups:  first, to disputants 
who wish to compromise but cannot agree on the terms of a settlement and, second, to parties 
who are averse to risk but want the benefit of a neutral assessment of their legal rights.  EVA 
may better meet the needs of these disputants than any existing form of dispute resolution, it may 
minimize the errors in resolving disputes, and it may encourage more desirable expenditures on 
litigation than trial. For all of these reasons, EVA is an idea whose time has come.  The next 
step is to make it available for litigants to try it and to see how well it works.
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Appendix I
The expected error costs under EVA and trial are the same, assuming the following definitions:
P = the likelihood the plaintiff is correct.
J = the likelihood the jury will apply the preponderance of evidence standard correctly.
O = the outcome if the plaintiff wins, with the only other possibility that she gets nothing.
In expected value arbitration, if the plaintiff can carry the burden of persuasion, the 
plaintiff will recover the outcome (O) multiplied by the likelihood the jury will decide correctly 
(J).  The odds are P that the plaintiff is correct, in which case the error is the difference between 
O and the amount awarded (O x J), and the odds are 1 - P that the plaintiff is incorrect, in which 
case the error is the amount awarded (O x J).
In mathematical terms, if P > .5, P(O - OJ) + (1 - P) (OJ) = PO + JO - 2PJO.
In expected value arbitration, if the plaintiff cannot carry the burden of persuasion, the 
plaintiff will recover the outcome (O) multiplied by the likelihood that the jury will err (1 - J).  
The odds are P that the plaintiff is correct, in which case the error is the difference between O 
and the amount awarded (O x (1 - J)), and the odds are 1 - P that the plaintiff is incorrect, in 
which case the error is the amount awarded (O x (1 - J)).
In mathematical terms, if P <= .5, P(O - O(1 - J)) + (1 - P)(O(1 - J)) = 2PJO - PO - JO + O.
In winner-take-all adjudication, if P should win under the preponderance of evidence 
standard, then the plaintiff’s recovery should be O.  Two possibilities then exist.  First, with a 
likelihood of P, the plaintiff will win when it should lose for an expected error of (1 - P) x O, 
plus the jury may err causing the plaintiff to lose, even though the plaintiff should win, for an 
expected error of (1 - J) x O.  Second, with a likelihood of 1 - P, the plaintiff will win when it 
should lose for an expected error of (1 - P) x O, except when jury error cause the plaintiff to lose 
when it should lose, for a decrease in error of (1 - J) x O.
In mathematical terms, if P > .5, the expected error is P((1 - P)O + (1 - J)O) + (1 - P)(((1 - P)O -
(1 - J)O) = PO + JO - 2PJO.
In winner-take-all adjudication, if P should lose under the preponderance of evidence 
standard, there should be no recovery.  Two possibilities again exist.  First, with a likelihood of 
P, the plaintiff will lose when it should win for an expected error of P x O, less the possibility of 
jury error causing the plaintiff to win when it should win, or (1 - J) x O.  Second, with a 
likelihood of 1 - P, the plaintiff will lose when it should win for an expected error of P x O, plus 
jury error will cause the plaintiff to win when it should lose for an additional expected error of (1 
- J) x O.
In mathematical terms, if P <= .5, the expected error is P( PO - (1 - J)O) + (1 - P)(PO + (1 - J)O) 
= 2PJO - PO - JO +O.
97
Appendix II
The proof assumes the following definitions:
P = the odds the plaintiff will win, which are the odds the plaintiff is correct.
O = the outcome if the plaintiff should win.
Assume also that there are two possible outcomes:  the plaintiff loses or recovers O.
The expected error costs from use of an expected value outcome are as follows:
In EVA, the plaintiff will receive P x O.
The odds are P that the plaintiff should win, but will receive only P x O, for expected 
error costs of P x (O – (P x O)).
The odds are (1 – P) that the plaintiff should lose, but will receive P x O, for expected (1 
– P) x (P x O).
The expected error costs, then, are P x (O – (P x O)) + (1 – P) x (P x O) = P x O – P2 x O 
+ P x O – P2 x O =  2 x P x O – 2 x (P2 x O).
The expected error costs in winner -take-all adjudication are:
The odds are P x (1 – P) that the plaintiff should win but will not win , in which case the 
expected error costs are P x (1 – P) x (O – 0), 
The odds are (1 – P) x (P) the plaintiff should lose but will win, in which case the 
expected error costs are (1 – P) x P x (O – 0).
The expected error costs, then, are P x (1 – P) x O + (1 – P) x P x O = 2 x P x O – 2 x (P2
x O).
The expected error costs are the same for EVA and trial.
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Appendix III
For purposes of this proof, the following definitions apply:
E = the error as measured by the square of the difference between the right result and the 
amount awarded in a case.
N = the number of different right outcomes that may occur in a case.
Pi = the likelihood that a given outcome Xi is correct.
Xi = a possible right outcome in a case.
A = the award in the case.
The error for a given correct result in a case is measured as E = Pi(A – Xi)2.
N
For all of the possible correct outcomes in a case, E = 31 Pi(A – Xi)2.
N
Setting the first derivative equal to zero to minimize errors, ME/MA = 31 (Pi)2(A – Xi) = 0.
N                     N
This is the same as stating 31 PiA = 31 PiXi.
N                  N
31 PiA = A, so A = 31 PiXi, which is the mean of the possible right results in litigation, with 
each weighted by its likelihood of being right.  This is the same as proportionate damages.  In 
other words, proportionate damages will minimize errors measured as the square of the 
difference between the right result and the actual award in litigation.
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Appendix IV
Assume litigation with two possible outcomes, O1 and O2.  O2 > O1.  
An investment of $c will correlate to a probability of p(c) of O2 and a probability of [1 – p(c)] of
O1.
A utility of U(x) is associated with a recovery of $x, which is the judgment less litigation costs.
Assume 0 < p(c) < 1, that is, the likelihood of O2 is between 0% and 100%.
Assume 0 < c < O2 – O1, that is, an investment in litigation is greater than $0 but less than the 
difference in outcomes.
Assume U’(x) > 0, that is, additional marginal dollars bring additional utility.
Assume U’’(x) < 0, that is, marginal utility diminishes with each additional dollar.
Assume p’(x) > 0, that is, larger investments in litigation will increase a party’s prospects at trial.
Assume p”(x) < 0, that is, marginal investments in litigation produce progressively less benefit.
(This should be true on the whole, although there will be instances in which a discontinuous 
benefit will accrue to party from a larger investment.)
The utility to a plaintiff who in EVA who spends $c is:
H(c) = U{p(c)(O2 – c) + [1 – p(c)](O1 – c)} = U{p(c)(O2 – O1) + (O1 – c)}
The first derivative is. . . 
H’(c) = U’{p(c)(O2 – O1) + (O1 – c)} [p’(c)(O2 – O1) – 1]
The second derivative is. . . 
H’’(c) = U’’{p(c)(O2 – O1) + (O1 – c)} [p’(c)(O2 – O1) – 1]2 + U’{p(c)(O2 – O1) + (O1 –
c)}[p’’(c)(O2 – O1).
The optimal c, which is C, follows from setting H’(c) = 0.  The first factor—U’—is, by 
assumption, greater than 0.  So p’(C)(O2 – O1) – 1 = 0.  In other words, p’(C) = 1/(O2 – O1).  
Note also that the second factor in H’’(c) = 0, U’ > 0, O2 > O1, and p’’(c) < 0, so c = C is an 
optimal investment, as measured in utils in EVA (as well as in dollars).
Analogous reasoning applies to investments by risk-averse defendants.
